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ABSTRACT 
 
Impacts of Multiple Stressors on Dryland Vulnerability and Land Conflict on the Border 
Communities of Southeast Kenya 
 
Alvin Maingi Solomon 
 
This study examines how individuals and groups respond to prevailing politico-
economic and biophysical changes and how the adjustments they make influence and are 
influenced by their social relations and material condition in spatial and temporal terms. 
This dissertation comprises of three parts: The first part is a critique of the climate-
conflict relationship debate and the problems associated with studies pushing for a causal 
relationship between climate variables and conflict. I argue that scholars lack of attention 
on varying institutional capacities and the focus solely on environmental factors as trigger 
mechanisms for conflict leads to misleading arguments about conflict distribution and 
frequency which may ultimately hinder the understanding of why conflicts occur, are 
exacerbated or resolved, recur or not. I find that as scholars focus on climatic variables in 
pursuit of narrow causations, they ignore known weaknesses in both theory and 
methodology. In addition, shifting from a human vulnerability approach to a human 
security one in climate conflict studies advances a functionalist conservative discourses 
that pay the most attention to securing the states of the global north and global capital 
circulation rather than helping vulnerable groups deal with risk and the impacts of 
climate change. The second part of the dissertation examines how social relations around 
land allocation and tenure in Africa have changed over time and how the existence of a 
dual system of tenure in many African countries produces a third system of informal land 
transfers. I argue that these often-unregulated informal transfers may help circumvent 
protections provided within law and policy. I find that, in Kenya as in many other parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the existence of many plots of land held as freehold without title 
coupled with an expensive and deeply bureaucratic process of titling produces and 
maintains unregulated land transfers that often cement inequalities that are addressed in 
formal policy and law. The third part of this dissertation utilizes the concept of 
“ecological gradient” to examine the social benefit of material relations for different 
livelihood groups living along the Mt Kilimanjaro altitudinal gradient. I find evidence of 
increased diversification and interdependence between the different livelihoods that 
occupy the ecological zones along the gradient. Consequently, livelihood groups living 
within the various ecological gradients along the mountain gradient adjust to changing 
biophysical and politico-economic factors by extracting social benefits from increased 
contact with each other.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is about shifting the focus from climate variables in the debate 
on human vulnerability and the impacts of climate variability and/or change to focus on 
day-to-day social relations among individuals and groups and how they respond to 
biophysical and economic changes in space and time. I chose to focus on social relations 
because the human response to climate change is only a part of broader adjustments that 
individuals and groups have to make in response to positive and negative changes in the 
environment that affect their livelihood relations in various scalar terms. Social relations 
encompass the confluences between people’s ideas, perceptions, believes, attitudes, and 
values, and the forces and relations that influence their existence and drive their means of 
production (Jackson, 1989). A people’s social relations are inextricably linked to their 
material experiences and are continually a space characterized by constant contestation 
and realignments in line with changes in the prevailing means of production.  
Mainstream studies on environmental conflict have produced two bodies of 
thought. The first suggests a positive link between scarcity and conflict, where 
competition for increasingly scarce resources such as fresh water and arable land are seen 
as making participation in conflicts, as a way of expressing grievances, the better 
opportunity in a cost benefit analysis (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006; Bergholt and 
Lujala, 2012; Hsiang et al. 2013; Ban, 2007). According to these scholars, environmental 
change may undermine resource availability and access patterns thereby exerting pressure 
on social institutions. Prominent conclusions from this body of research suggest that both 
delayed onset and early onset precipitation extremes have a direct influence on the level 
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of risk of conflict. They also postulate an increasing risk for conflict with environmental 
degradation. Critics of this approach argue that focusing on the structural factors that 
precipitate conflict and ignoring the decisions of actors to engage in violence is 
problematic (Adano et al. 2012; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Peluso and Watts, 2001). Such 
views have also been criticized for their failure to recognize the role of conflict in 
creating and escalating new grievances, and the role of conflict as a major agent of 
poverty and vulnerability (Theisen, 2012; Salehyan, 2008; Bax, 2002). In addition 
Nordas and Gleditsch argue that the causal mechanisms within this approach operate 
within multiple pathways and have “[...] failed to account for differing levels of economic 
and political development on resource consumption and conflict” (2007:704). 
 The second body of research questions any direct connection between 
environmental change and natural resource conflict. It is made up of two main groups: 
quantitative analysis of national and sub-national climate and conflict data (Buhaug, 
2010; Kalyvas, 2006; O’Loughlin, et al. 2012; Scheffran, et al. 2012a), and qualitative 
analysis that focuses mainly on local level power dynamics (Peluso and Watts, 2001; 
Basset, 1998; Turner, 2004; Theissen, 2012; Adano et al. 2012; Butler, 2012; Peters, 
2013). Although these bodies of research recognize that there may be links between 
environmental change and natural resource conflict, they are critical of any causality or 
direct relationship due to the presence of many intervening variables. They concur with 
the argument that the risks of environmental change to social systems may be related to 
the changes in the environmental system but point out that the importance of the 
characteristics of the social systems (Barnet and Adger, 2007; Salehyan, 2008; Raleigh 
and Kniveton, 2012) and the motivations of actors cannot be ignored in assessing risk 
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(Adano et al. 2012). For example, Hendrix and Glasser (2007) argued that environmental 
factors as trend and trigger measures are not associated with the onset of conflict in the 
absence of socioeconomic control variables while Theisen (2012) and Adano et al. (2012) 
found that the years of scarcity tended to be more peaceful which is opposite of what 
much of the literature on the effects of scarcity suggests. 
 The methodological approaches to environmental conflict have also been influential 
on the findings. For instance, much of the quantitative work on environmental conflict 
research relies on state-based conflict data, which has a death threshold and may limit the 
definition of conflict to those that involve governments (Scheffran et al. 2012b). 
Although more sophisticated datasets that attempt to cover local level conflicts such as 
the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED) and the Social Conflict in 
Africa Database (SCAD) are being developed, the extent of their coverage and scope of 
conflict remains to be seen. In addition, this aggregate notion of covering conflicts as 
events misses out on the subtleties and complexity of the processes that underlie many 
conflicts. The nature of environmental variables used in conflict research is also 
important.  For example, long term studies on precipitation and temperature and their 
impact on resource availability and access may miss proximate factors that may influence 
conflict (Hendrix and Glasser, 2007; Scheffran et al. 2012a; Theisen, 2012). This is 
because there may exist other underlying issues surrounding resource tenure and 
ownership that are exceptionally context dependent and not attributable to one causal 
mechanism.  
 On the other hand, qualitative studies are able to examine and disentangle the 
complex web of factors that underlie conflict, especially the politics of resource access 
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and use. However, it has been argued that they may not be generalizable beyond the 
specific context of their study. Scheffran et al. (2012b:4) assert that both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches may not independently “[...] be robust against variation of model 
variables and assumptions, for instance regarding conflict type, involved parties, regional 
samples, and time periods.” A mixed method approach may thus be more analytically 
sound for this type of study because of the opportunities it may provide in terms of data 
triangulation and explanation of the complex relationships between variables. A nuanced 
approach may also involve examining environmental conflict from a conflict angle rather 
than environmental factors or climate variables. 
 However, despite the availability of evidence in academic and policy debates and 
research about the problems associated with simplistic scarcity and causality arguments 
and methodological issues associated with studies on the climate-conflict relationship, 
such simplistic arguments continue to permeate government, military, and other policy 
circles. The most recent simplistic quantitative studies seem to originate from a group of 
scholars within the broader human security approach (Hsiang and Burke, 2014; Hsiang et 
al. 2013). I examine the origins of human security debates on climate and conflict and 
their evolution in chapter two of this dissertation and argue that a human vulnerability 
approach is more proactive and pro-poor in dealing with the impacts of climate change 
than a human security one. 
 In this dissertation, I take away the gaze from climatic variables as key drivers for 
conflict and focus primarily on conflict itself and the social relations that may or may not 
produce conflict. Owing to the debates discussed above and also recognizing that the 
issue of environmental conflict cannot be exhaustively examined in a single dissertation, 
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the objectives of this dissertation are threefold: First, critically examine the climate-
conflict nexus question and recent debates on causality; secondly, examine land and land 
relations as key factors that may drive local conflicts in places dependent primarily on 
natural capital; and thirdly, examine the changing social relations among livelihood 
groups along the Mt Kilimanjaro gradient in response to ecological and politico-
economic factors and how these changing social relations may strengthen livelihoods but 
also increase the risk for conflict. These objectives are achieved through three 
independent papers that deal with each of the objectives but generally speak to the 
situated nature of social relations that drive local conflicts, which are more prevalent in 
our world today than broader interstate conflicts. The methods and findings of the three 
papers are summarized below. 
 The first paper is a critical review of conflict studies across the disciplines and the 
recent push towards establishing a causal relationship between climate change and 
conflict. It starts by defining conflict and explaining why theoretical and methodological 
conflation of the concepts of violence and conflict may lead to confusion. The article then 
goes through important considerations in establishing a typology of conflict such as scale, 
duration, participants, location, and the nature of grievances. This allows me to argue for 
the situatedness of conflict and against broad generalizations in pursuit for narrow causal 
arguments. This article also traces the origins of the climate-conflict debates in both 
policy and academic circles from the 1980s to date. I find that earlier approaches based 
on human vulnerability were largely disserted for the more recent conservative 
functionalist human security approaches, which are based on an interpretation of climate 
change as not just a threat to general human security but more often the security of the 
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homeland in the global north and by extension the security of global capital circulation. I 
then illustrate this through a critique of two prominent articles published in 2013 and 
2014 in support of a causal relationship between climate change and conflict. 
 The second paper examines how the rapid transformation of social relations 
around land in Africa have led to a system of informal land transfers in some places that 
helps circumvent protections contained in both formal policy and customary practice. I 
examine three key discourses around land tenure and conflict in the developing world: 
the benefits of the negotiability of rights within customary tenure for certain groups, 
discourse on land tenure formalization and capital formation, and discourse on land 
conflict. I argue that the existence of dual land tenure systems in many parts of Africa 
produces and maintains an unregulated third system of informal land transfers that is 
neither purely customary nor purely in line with formal legal and policy procedures. 
Consequently, this system of informal land transfers disenfranchise certain groups such 
as women and the youth that recent policy seeks to protect and may provide avenues for 
local land conflicts. I utilize qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey to illustrate 
this situation in a case study from Njukini in Southern Kenya. 
The third paper uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods to 
examine the patterns of livelihood diversification and the intensification of 
interdependence in the Mt Kilimanjaro altitudinal gradient. I use the ecological gradient 
as an organizing framework (see: Majule et al. 2009) to understand the social and 
economic relationships among the different livelihood groups living in the Kilimanjaro 
gradient and how these patterns have changed over time. I argue that social relations 
between livelihood groups along the altitudinal gradient have changed in response to 
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changes in the ecological and politico-economic systems at various temporal and spatial 
scales. I find evidence of increased livelihood diversification and the intensification of 
interdependence among different livelihood groups living in different ecological zones of 
the gradient. I argue that this intensification of interdependence may strengthen 
livelihoods against multiple stressors but may also increase the risk for conflict due to 
increased inter-group and individual contact. 
Summary of the main findings 	  
The overarching argument for this dissertation is that the human response to 
climate variation and/or change cannot be isolated from people’s day-to-day responses to 
other stressors and general variations in livelihood options. I find that the human response 
to climate impacts is influenced by the ability of individuals and groups to respond to 
other stressors and threats to their livelihoods. In addition, local capabilities to respond to 
multiple stressors, including climate impacts, may be influenced by changing intensity 
and frequency of stressors and overall changes in the broader political economy of 
resources access. This may also include their ability to recover from more immediate 
livelihood stressors such crop failure and drought, which may weaken their overall 
adaptive capacity. With regards to the climate-conflict relationship, I find that the causal 
pathways for a climate conflict relationship are too complex to be attributable to a set of 
climate variables without consideration of varying institutional set ups and other politico-
economic factors. In addition, I find that negative climate impacts may bring individuals 
and groups together for mutual benefit from scarce resources, which further complicates 
the argument for causality. Other research has also shown that socioeconomic 
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development may strengthen states and other institutional capacity to provide social 
welfare for affected groups at varying degrees. 
  Changing social relations of production and resource access may also influence 
the capability of a livelihood system to adjust and respond to stress. This is in turn 
influenced by changes in the prevailing mode of production and biophysical factors that 
may affect local and broader production systems. The second paper illustrates how 
changing social relations around land may strengthen access patterns and provide 
protections for groups that may have been disenfranchised by earlier land tenure regimes. 
However, I also find that changes in resource access patterns and the institutions that 
govern them may provide loopholes for disenfranchisement and conflict among 
individuals and groups. Livelihood systems may also be strengthened by mutual benefits 
derived from increased contact among individuals and groups living with diverse 
ecological zones through social relations of exchange and interdependence. In the third 
paper, I find that increased intergroup and individual contact provides various livelihoods 
with diversification options but also that increased contact may increase the risk for 
conflict in the absence of a capable and legitimate institutional framework to govern 
relations.    
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CHAPTER 2: ON CAUSALITY AND THE UNCERTAIN: A 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CLIMATE-
CONFLICT NEXUS 
 
Abstract 
 
 Recent critical and empirical human-environment studies indicate that climate 
change will result in major disruptions to both social and ecological systems. This, recent 
studies indicate, may increase the vulnerability of livelihoods and increase the risk of 
conflict. I trace the emergence of simplistic, environmentally deterministic approaches to 
the climate-conflict nexus to the shift from human vulnerability to human security. I then 
link human security debates to the security of the homeland in the global North and to 
global capital circulation, which seem to be facilitating the prevalence these simplistic 
studies. I argue that the lack of attention on varying institutional capacities while 
focusing solely on environmental factors as trigger mechanisms for conflict leads to 
misleading arguments about conflict distribution and frequency which may ultimately 
hinder the understanding of why conflicts occur, are exacerbated or resolved, recur or 
not. I rely on two recent articles to illustrate the potential pitfalls of pursuing a causal 
link between climate and conflict, asserting that conflict is rarely, if ever, a strategic 
choice in resolving issues related to resource access. 
     
Keywords: Conflict, Security, Climate, Vulnerability, Livelihoods, Institutions. 
 
Solomon, M. On causality and the uncertain: A critical examination of the climate 
conflict nexus. Human Geography. On review.  
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Introduction 
 
“[…] That spirit of cooperation needs to energize the global effort to combat 
climate change, a creeping national security crisis that will help shape your time in 
uniform, as we are called on to respond to refugee flows and natural disasters, and 
conflicts over water and food.” (Obama, 2014) 
 
 The above quote appears on a transcript of President Obama’s commencement 
address at West Point in May 2014. Although this statement may appear to be common 
sense, it represents a growing discourse in security and policy circles that frames climate 
change as a security issue. President Obama’s comments about climate and security were 
politically strategic as they came a month after the release of the IPCC (2014) report that 
dedicated a whole chapter on the issue of the impacts of climate change on human 
security and only days before he launched new rules to cut carbon emissions from power 
plants. Central to the argument for military intervention on climate impacts is the view 
that climate change will be a threat multiplier in conflict environments and may be thus 
threat to the security of the economies and citizens of developed countries. This article is 
critical of this recent push to securitize climate change and is guided by the following 
questions: One, why are simplistic, environmentally deterministic approaches to the 
climate-conflict nexus so pervasive in press, policy, and academic circles? Two, what are 
the potential pitfalls of some recent quantitative studies that have aided the recent policy 
push? I argue that this interventionist debates by developed countries has the potential to 
divert attention from the root causes of vulnerability to climate change and conflict. In 
addition, the interventionist debate is in furtherance of a national security and economic 
policy for developed countries and is thus reactionary and paternalistic.      
 The linkages between climate change and conflict have received unprecedented 
attention from policymakers, analysts, and academics over the last decade (Nordas and 
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Gleditsch, 2007; Hendrix and Glasser, 2007; Salehyan, 2008; Scheffran et al. 2012b; 
Adano et al. 2012; IPCC, 2014). In academic circles, there has been increased interest in 
the relationship between the impacts of climate change and conflict with a growing focus 
on the linkages of the said relationship to local and global security. Some recent studies 
have undertaken synthesis and re-analysis of earlier studies across broad temporal and 
spatial scales (Hsiang et al. 2013; Hsiang and Burke, 2014) in an attempt to find causal 
links between climate and conflict. Security agencies around the world have also 
identified environmental change and more specifically climate change as a potential 
threat to human security with bodies such as the United Nations Security Council 
identifying climate change as a critical issue for global security.  
 However, recent empirical and critical studies suggest that the relationship 
between climate and conflict is both ambivalent and inconclusive (Scheffran et al. 2012b; 
Butzer, 2012; Butler and Gates, 2012; Benjaminsen et al. 2012; Hendrix and Salehyan, 
2012; IPCC, 2014). A comprehensive review of the most recent literature shows limited 
support for viewing environmental factors as key influencers of conflict trends although 
much of the literature supports the idea that under certain circumstances, they may 
increase the risk to conflict (Scheffran et al. 2012b; Bernauer et al. 2012; Gleditsch, 
2012). In addition, some scholars suggest that local level conflicts are more likely to 
result from environmental factors than larger conflicts (Scheffran et al. 2012b). Arising 
from the literature is the importance of the role of institutions in conflict mediation with 
some pointing out that regions with good institutional conflict resolution mechanisms 
tend to resolve their issues peacefully (Adano et al. 2012; Butler and Gates, 2012; 
Theisen, 2012) while those regions where conflict is seen as a normal way of interaction 
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are more likely to engage in conflict (Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012; Adano et al. 2012). 
However, the role of conflict in providing avenues for strengthening communities 
through sharing collective resources or as a source of new grievances for future conflicts 
is underrepresented in the literature. 
 This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by examining the climate conflict 
debate from the typology and nature of conflict, an examination of why simplistic 
environmentally deterministic approaches are pervasive, and illustrate that by providing a 
critique of two high-level journal articles published recently in the journal Science and 
Climatic Change. I contend that the recent empirical push to establish causality between 
climate and conflict using datasets of various temporal and spatial scales is simplistic and 
ignores known weaknesses in both data and methodology. In the next section I define the 
concepts “conflict” and “violence” and examine the potential theoretical and 
methodological confusion that may arise by conflating the two. I will follow that by 
establishing a brief typology of conflict and then briefly trace the evolution of the 
climate-conflict discourse in the last thirty years. I will then draw upon Hsiang et al. 
(2013) and Hsiang and Burke (2014) to illustrate the points made in section two, three, 
and four. I conclude by asserting that the causal structure and the outcomes of conflict are 
complex and asymmetrical especially in a climate change vulnerability context and they 
also vary in spatial and temporal terms. Moreover, the causal structure and outcome/s of 
any conflict are rooted in a particular context. In addition, the focus on environmental 
factors as trigger mechanisms for conflict leads to misleading arguments about conflict 
distribution and frequency, allows researchers to shift attention from differing 
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institutional capacities, and ultimately hinders the understanding of why conflicts occur, 
are exacerbated or resolved, recur or not. 
Defining Conflict  
 
“[...] Conflict is both structured and structuring: structured because the idea of 
violence results from historical events, stored at the memory of past deeds, of past 
encounters, of past frustrations; and structuring because the idea of violence 
informs human actions, determines the acceptability, even the banality of 
violence, if not the ability to erase the scandal of its occurrence.” (Dumont, 
1992:277). 
 
“Conflict” and “violence” are not synonymous. Theoretical and methodological 
conflation of the two ideas leads to confusion, at best. Conflict covers a wide range of 
social relations of real or perceived disagreement that may range from simple relations of 
interpersonal competition or criminality to larger scale and complex forms of domination 
or war (Eriksen and Lind, 2009; Fisher et al. 2000; Goodhand, 2001; Ellis and ter Haar, 
2004). Violence on the other hand involves actions or structural arrangements that result 
in physical or nonphysical harm to individuals or groups among actors involved in a 
specific conflict situation (Harper et al. 2012; Fisher et al. 2000; Das et al. 2000; Riches, 
1986). In essence therefore, violence is only a sub-category of the broader 
conceptualization of conflict. Many conflicts are resolved without turning into violence 
(Fisher et al. 2000; Salehyan, 2008) while others persist for generations sometimes 
erupting into violence but most of the time remaining subtle and in many cases only so 
present to the individuals or groups who experience them. From this basic approach 
therefore, conflict can be seen as potentially both positive and negative depending on its 
nature while violence is only negative. For instance, despite the death and destruction that 
characterized the American civil war, the end of the war saw some positive changes in 
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American society such as the reunification of the states, the effective end to slavery, and 
industrialism boosted by wartime production.   
It is important to distinguish between conflict and violence. First, although 
violence is one of the raw forms of conflict and therefore may be easy to track, using 
recorded or reported incidences of certain types of violence to show the rates and/or 
trends of conflict for different regions may be misleading. This is because as mentioned 
earlier, many conflicts do not turn into violence and the existence of institutions to deal 
with conflicts in certain places may serve to control the number of conflicts that turn 
violent. Second, many quantitative studies have relied exclusively on datasets of reported 
violence to make generalizations about conflict without explaining or at least 
acknowledging the potential conceptual issues that arise from the definitions they adopt. 
For instance, in places where institutions have the capacity and capability to resolve 
conflicts may generally be able to avoid potentially destructive violence or even tap the 
conflicting forces for constructive change (Fisher et al. 2000).   
This paper considers conflict to be context specific and follows Peluso and Watts 
(2001:5) assertion that violence is a “[…] a site specific phenomenon rooted in the local 
histories and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation 
and power relations.” Through this approach, I avoid focusing only on violence that more 
often has given rise to a large discourse on human security such as been adopted by the 
Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014). It 
also accounts for contexts where conflicts occur but are resolved, exacerbated, and recur 
or not in order to highlight the importance of institutional capacity in conflict mediation 
and resolution. This approach helps keep the focus on the critical sociopolitical relations 
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that influence conflict and avoids the growing debate that blames climate for conflict 
(Hsiang et al. 2013; Hsiang and Burke, 2014) although, on its own, climate has no 
bearing on where, when, and why conflicts occur or not. 
A Brief Typology of Conflict 	  
 In their much-publicized articles, Hsiang et al. (2013) and Hsiang and Burke 
(2014) do not provide a typology of conflict. This is not just convenient but much 
strategic for two important reasons: One, it allows them to avoid questions around 
context and combine a wide range of human interactions into one category, conflict. 
Secondly, it allows them to ignore the root causes of conflict popular within human 
vulnerability debates (Turner, 2004; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Basset, 1988) in favor of 
the more recent debates around human security (IPCC, 2014; Barnett and Adger, 2007), 
which are popular in policy circles. In the next section, I explain the difference between 
these two approaches to climate and conflict but first I would like to illustrate why a 
typology of conflict is critical in any analysis of conflict.  
 The classification of conflicts varies widely across academic disciplines. The 
Correlates of War (COW) typology, which is widely used in international politics and 
conflict studies, classifies conflict using the following major variables: the temporal 
domain, battle-related fatalities, the bulk of fighting, the outcome of fighting, the conflict 
initiator, conflict duration, and location (Sarkees et al. 2010). Four major types of conflict 
emerge from this typology: Inter-state conflicts, extra-state conflicts, intra-state conflicts, 
and non-state conflicts. Inter-state conflicts are defined in this typology as between 
territorial states, involving armed forces in both sides, and a threshold of one thousand 
battle-related deaths per year. Extra-systemic wars on the other hand involve a member of 
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the state system battling a non-state entity. Intra-state conflicts are divided into civil wars 
(which involve national governments), regional internal wars (which involve sub-national 
governments), and communal conflicts, which do not involve any level of national 
government. Lastly, non-state conflicts are those that do take place within autonomous 
non-state territories and those that take place within two or more states but among non-
state actors (this type of conflicts may also be classified under extra-systemic conflicts).  
 Like many other typologies, the COW typology is not uncontroversial. This is 
generally because conflict is a highly political affair and interventions even more so. For 
instance, for a conflict to be labeled genocide in the United Nations (UN) system, it has 
to go through a vote in the UN Security Council (UNSC). This is of course because of the 
implications of such categorizing the most important being that any state within the UN 
system can intervene in cases of genocide. Perhaps the most controversial variable for the 
COW typology is the death threshold, which excludes subtle and sometimes long running 
conflicts that do not involve at least one thousand battle-related fatalities per year. Also, 
the definition of battle-related fatalities may exclude deaths related to but not directly 
resulting from battles between actors in any conflict.  
The concept of grievance or the motivation of actors is also important in conflict 
analysis and especially in establishing a typology of conflict. A grievance is a real or a 
perceived wrong or other cause for complaint (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009). 
Grievances cause conflicts and may be originated from one or multiple sides of any 
particular conflict. The nature and scale of grievances are critical in establishing the type 
of conflict. For example, the nature of grievances may be related to resource access that 
would lead to a resource conflict (Turner, 2004; Basset, 1988) while ethnic and racial 
	   17	  
grievances may lead to ethnic and racial conflicts respectively. However, classifying 
conflict from a grievance perspective is also has many challenges. This is because the 
grievances of the main participants of a conflict may obscure other forces that may 
benefit from the conflict but their interests may not necessarily align with those of the 
actors. For example, the many local actors in the 2007-2008 post-election violence in 
Kenya may have cited historical injustices around land allocation as the main grievance 
(CIPEV, 2008) but later studies and government commissions have showed that the 
violence may have been organized to keep or remove certain groups from power (Brown 
and Sriram, 2012; Mueller, 2011; Kagwanja, 2009; IREC, 2008) rather than resolve the 
said “historical injustices”. 
Scale gives conflict the spatial dimension. Traditional scalar containers of 
classifying conflict include: local, regional, national, and global. However, studies have 
shown that scale is much more complicated than these hierarchical and pregiven 
boundaries suggest (Kaplan et al. 1999; Herod and Wright, 2002; Zimmerer and Basset, 
2003; Rangan and Kull, 2009). These scholars see scale as being intertwined and 
overlapping. According to Herod and Wright (2002), scale is socially produced as part of 
social praxis and therefore does not pre-exist the social actors and practices that create it. 
Even when scale is viewed in dual terms, as in global versus local, the two scales being 
compared or contrasted are seen as producing and to some extent constituting each other. 
Even more politically important is what gets classified as a global threat in the case of 
conflict versus what is considered local. This is because, according to Herod and Wright 
(2002:1-2), a “[…] nexus of power and space” exists behind scale and social actors may 
attempt “[…] to scale their own activities in ways that allow them to exercise power or 
	   18	  
that facilitate the denial of power to others.” The classification of climate as an important 
global security issue thus puts the climate-conflict nexus in the center of this scalar 
debate.        
  The challenge for any analysis of conflict is thus to ensure that the variables used 
to classify conflict are examined in a way that helps us understand conflict without 
oversimplifying these same concepts in order to establish narrow conclusions. Hsiang et 
al. (2013), for example, adopt a broad definition of conflict that ranges from individual 
level aggression to national instability including civil war in an analysis and reanalysis 
that argues for causality between conflict and climate variables but does not consider 
conflict type or context. Such an approach is problematic because it does not tell us what 
particular role conflict plays in the context of climate change beyond narrow Malthusian 
assumptions of scarcity and competition. Such assertions have been discredited by recent 
studies that show that actors are strategic in their choices during times of scarcity and 
conflict does not necessarily confer any advantage in times of scarcity or even in the 
pursuit for redistribution (Adano et al. 2012; Theisen, 2012; Salehyan, 2008). However, 
attempts to establish a causal link between climate and conflict in furtherance of a human 
security discourse continue in conflict studies and have recently become even more 
pervasive. 
Climate threat? From vulnerability to security 	  
 Two major works in the 1980s shaped the way geographers study the relationship 
between conflict and environmental change. Watts (1983) and Basset (1988) used a 
political ecology approach to show how local human-environment relations interacted 
with the broader political economy to shape resource conflicts in West Africa. These 
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studies were a response to earlier Malthusian scarcity approaches that could not explain 
why conflicts occurred even in spaces and/or times of resource abundance and why 
certain groups lost rights while others gained. The 1980s was also a period of intensified 
debate about global warming and specifically the impacts of climate change on the 
environment. During this period, environmental conflict debates were dominated by 
studies on human vulnerability, food security, environmental degradation, and disasters. 
 As the debate about the impacts of climate change almost reached fever pitch in 
the mid 1990s, Thomas Homer-Dixon published Environmental scarcities and violent 
conflict (1994) which argued that resource scarcity caused by an increasing population 
could lead to civil wars and mass migration. In the same year Robert Kaplan published 
his controversial but much popular article The coming of anarchy, which followed the 
same line of argument as Homer-Dixon. These two works generated a lot of discussion in 
government and policy circles about the impacts of resource scarcity caused by climate 
change on not just conflict but human security. It is during this time that focus shifted 
from a discourse on human vulnerability to climate change to one of human security 
against climate change. According to the IPCC (2014:759), human security is  “[…] a 
condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected and when people 
have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity.”  
The leap from human vulnerability to human security in the late 1990s and early 
2000s saw environmental conflict debates become stretched into climate change without 
the existence of any scientific consensus on the link between climate and conflict (Oels, 
2012). The 2000s also saw environmental NGOs, governments, and militaries begin to 
commission studies on the linkages between climate change and security. For example, 
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the US military commissioned the Scenario Planning study by Schwartz and Randall 
(2003), the UK government commissioned the Stern Review (2007), and the German 
government commissioned the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 
2008). Interestingly, while both the UK and the US report present climate change as a 
threat to human security (national and international), the report from the German 
government rejects the human security framing and adopts a human vulnerability one that 
emphasizes the strengthening of livelihoods. In 2007, Political Geography published a 
special issue on the relationship between climate and conflict and argued that there was 
limited support for environmental factors as key influencers for conflict (Hendrix and 
Glasser, 2007; Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007; Barnett and Adger, 2007). This was one of 
the first attempts to link climate and conflict within academic circles. Since then, many 
studies have been published on the subject but no consensus has been reached to date on 
the relationship between climate and conflict. The IPCC also avoided using the language 
of human security in its 2001 and 2007 climate assessment reports. However, from 2009 
the discourse of human security and causality between conflict and climate gained 
prominence and culminated in the IPCC (2014) report from the working group II 
allocating human security a whole chapter and the publication of two high level articles 
claiming a causal relationship between climate and conflict (Hsiang et al. 2013; Hsiang 
and Burke, 2014).  
 The concept of human security in a climate-conflict nexus implies in its framing a 
national security agenda. Consequently, human security debates hare framed not just 
around individual security but the security of the state. This framing has the implication 
of creating binaries between the state and a threat that is posed by not just climate change 
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itself but also ‘aliens’ who may not be able to cope with climate impacts. This framing 
leads to conservative functionalist studies that attempt to model people’s behavior vis-à-
vis their environment, which in turn leads to reactionary policy. According Oels (2012) 
“[…] since 9/11, human security has more often than not been redefined in terms of 
homeland security of the global North.” By redefining human security into homeland 
security, governments have therefore been able to legitimize policies aimed at not just 
securing the state but also global capital circulation for the benefit of states especially in 
the global North. Oels (2012) argues that when human security is so defined, it leads to 
policies that are biased towards the strategic interests of the global North. Human 
vulnerability thus represents a more pro-poor framing than human security in a climate-
conflict nexus. 
Challenging Hsiang’s Causality   	  
In an article published in the journal Science in the summer of 2013, Hsiang et al. 
(2013) claim to have found that “[…] large deviations from normal precipitation and mild 
temperatures systematically increase the risk of many types of conflict.” These 
conclusions were made from a synthesis of data from 60 quantitative studies drawn from 
a variety of disciplines. In another article published in Climatic Change, Hsiang and 
Burke (2014) use the same approach, this time with 50 studies, and find support for a 
causal relationship between climate variables and conflict. It should be noted at this point 
that all these studies are based upon datasets of violence at different scales and for 
differing time periods and do not include any consideration for qualitative assessments of 
the causes of violence in these places. This section examines the approach used in these 
two high profile articles and argues that their theoretical and methodological perspective 
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is set up to lead to the conclusions that the articles make. Given the high profile nature of 
these articles and the recent refocusing of conflict towards arguments relating to security, 
these conclusions may have substantial impacts on policy and people and thus should not 
go unquestioned. 
 Dataset Issues: The datasets and the methodological approaches used to process 
the data on studies about the climate-conflict nexus are critically important when said 
studies generate such socio-politically explosive conclusions (Scheffran et al. 2012a; 
Hendrix and Glasser, 2007). Some of the data variables used by Hsiang et al. (2013) and 
Hsiang and Burke (2014) include: violent personal crime data, violent inter-group data, 
rape, political inter-group violence, riots, civil war incidence and onset, political leader 
exit, paleoclimate reconstructions, and climatological variables such as rainfall and 
temperature. All these types of data and the specific datasets have weaknesses that are not 
explained in Hsiang et al. (2013) and Hsiang and Burke (2014) and that may lead to 
misleading conclusions especially if they are all combined together in one analysis. I 
therefore examine the potential weaknesses of the analysis of a few data types vis-à-vis 
climate variables in order to illustrate potential problems with Hsiang’s studies. 
 Much of the quantitative work on the relationship between climate and conflict 
research relies on state-based conflict data, such as Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO), which has death thresholds in their conflict 
typology. The UCDP/PRIO typology is similar to that of the COW, which is discussed, 
and its potential weaknesses pointed out in a different section of this paper. The 
UCDP/PRIO dataset, which is widely used in conflict studies, is collected mostly from 
newspaper and other media reports. This means that it may not include unreported 
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conflicts and also more subtle and often long-running conflicts that may not be 
considered newsworthy. Consequently, the editors of such news media have the 
responsibility of picking which conflicts are newsworthy and which are not. This 
situation presents two major dataset and methodological issues: one, the selection of 
which conflicts make it to the news is based upon a market criteria intended on selling 
news, and two, there are serious problems of coverage because a news media outlet may 
only be able to report conflicts in places where it has access and therefore may not report 
conflicts in marginalized regions or in places with long-running conflicts which may not 
be considered news or newsworthy. 
 Another major source of data for the studies that Hsiang et al. (2013) and Hsiang 
and Burke (2014) rely on in their reanalysis is crime data. Crime data in these studies is 
based upon conflict related police reports and is often presented vis-à-vis rainfall or 
temperature data. Crime reports may not necessarily be evidence of an actual crime but 
even if researchers were to rely upon conviction data, this would introduce a much 
messier problem of having to deal with the process of evidence gathering and legality. 
Also, crime data is limited to those conflicts that are actually reported and those that 
qualify as crime in a particular place. This presents its challenges because crime reports 
depend largely upon a population’s perceptions towards law enforcement and whether or 
not people believe that their cases will be handled fairly or not. In addition, a legalistic 
approach, which focuses solely on what is considered crime in a legal sense, may miss 
many other types of conflicts or deviance that may not necessarily be considered illegal. 
Furthermore, it might be difficult to classify some crimes as property crimes and 
therefore more related to economic shocks while others may be classified as purely 
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violent. Class and spatial dynamics also come into play as certain groups and/or regions 
may actually exploit economic shocks for their benefit.  
 Economic data used in studies on the causal relationship between climate and 
conflict also have major limitations. Finding a direct causal relationship between conflict 
and climate variables is therefore misleading if it does not address the potential 
challenges associated with economic data and methodology that led to such a conclusion. 
For instance, use of economic variables, especially Gross Domestic Product (GDP), may 
not reflect the day-to-day livelihood dynamics for certain groups and particularly those 
primarily reliant on natural capital. In addition, according to Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) 
economic growth may be a consequence rather than a cause of violence. Economic 
growth may marginalize and disenfranchise certain groups and this may fuel grievances 
for conflict (Stiglitz et al. 2013). However, economic growth can also be achieved as a 
result of conflict and marginalization against certain groups and this may also result to 
conflict. Furthermore, economic growth may not affect the majority of the population or 
even the people involved in the conflicts in particular places. This raises the question of 
how good it is as a variable and how it is defined. If it is a matter of a simple change in 
the GDP, then this may at certain times mean nothing to the groups involved in conflict. 
Economic growth as a variable in the analysis between climate and conflict must measure 
the socioeconomic status for the groups involved rather than using a blanket economic 
measure (GDP) for the entire country or region as in several studies that Hsiang et al. 
(2013) utilize in their reanalysis. 
 Disease and epidemiology data from the Global Infectious Disease and 
Epidemiology Network is also used in Hsiang et al. (2013) reanalysis. This data is 
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retrieved from Cervellati et al.’s (2011) article that argues “[…] disease richness is a 
statistically robust and quantitatively relevant determinant of civil conflicts for the period 
1960-2004.” However, several issues arise from the use of this dataset. First, diseases and 
their spread can be a consequence of civil war, social disorder or other climatic shocks 
such as drought which may lead to economic disruptions causing malnutrition and 
consequently vulnerability to infectious diseases. Removal/eviction/migration and 
concentration (in refugee or Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps) due to civil war or 
shocks related to the environment could also create conditions for spread of infectious 
diseases. Civil war or general state of social disorder may make it difficult to identify and 
treat infectious diseases allowing them easy spread. We have to ask ourselves what the 
direction of the relationship is, how do they influence each other, why the co-occurrence, 
and whether the relationship has to be causal? In addition, it is important to specify when 
these epidemics occur. For instance, do they occur before, during, or after the conflicts? 
Many large-scale conflicts are known to begin with smaller subtle conflicts that may also 
be potentially destabilizing and may result to the marginalization of certain individuals or 
groups leading to poor or no access to key medical services and other social welfare 
resources. 
 Democratization data such as the Polity IV, Archigos, World Bank Development 
Indicators, and GDP data from different sources including the Penn World tables is also 
compared with climate variables such as temperature and rainfall. Some of the studies 
utilized by Hsiang et al. (2013) include: Dell et al. (2012), Bruckner and Ciccone (2011), 
and Burke (2012). Interestingly, the findings in some of these studies are contradictory. 
For instance, Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) find that “[…] negative rainfall shocks are 
	   26	  
followed by significant improvement in democratic institutions” while Burke (2012) 
finds that faster economic growth may help keep political leaders in power. For Bruckner 
and Ciccone, negative economic shocks provide a window of opportunity for citizens to 
contest power leading to more democratic institutions. On the other hand, Burke claims 
that faster economic growth ensures support for political leaders and therefore the 
likelihood they will retain their positions. The implication for these two studies is that 
both economic growth and decline (shocks) may lead to potentially positive social 
change. Consequently, economic growth or decline, as set up in these studies tells us 
nothing about political change. Dell et al. (2012) find no relationship between 
precipitation and growth in both poor and rich countries but find no relationship between 
temperature and growth in “rich” countries. Several questions thus arise from these data: 
if the increase in temperature does affect economic output/growth but precipitation has no 
effect, does increase in temperature presume drought (decrease in precipitation or 
increase in evaporation)? Assuming we had an increase in both precipitation and 
temperature for a given period would this lead to economic decline? I also find the use of 
the Polity IV dataset and Archigos to quantify trends in regime change in “poor 
countries” while ignoring broader sociopolitical and economic changes such as neoliberal 
“democratization” efforts and the end of the cold war quite misleading. Hsiang et al.’s 
(2013) reanalysis of these datasets does not change the fact that other broader changes in 
global politics may have substantially influenced conflict and democratization tends in 
the regions in question. 
Scale: Hsiang et al. (2013) and Hsiang and Burke (2014) adopt a broad approach 
to conflict that ranges from individual level conflict to much broader national level civil 
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war. The datasets used also range from personal aggression documented in police crime 
records to datasets of much larger conflicts with death thresholds such as the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict 
dataset. In the UCDP/PRIO dataset, for example, the definition of a non-state conflict is 
“[…] the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the 
government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.” Other 
conflicts that may involve less than 25 battle-related deaths or deaths that may not be 
considered battle-related are not included in this dataset. Such deaths may include those 
that result from the effects of conflict on access to medical services, food, and other basic 
necessities. Also, other acts of violence however rampant that may not meet the 
requirements of this definition may not be considered non-state conflict. Generalizing 
conclusions from a dataset such as this and individual crime data from police reports is 
misleading. Wisner et al. (2004:3) remark that: 
Occasionally earthquakes have killed hundreds of thousands, and very 
occasionally, floods, famines or epidemics have taken millions of lives at a 
time…many more lives are lost in violent conflict and to the preventable outcome 
of disease and hunger. 
This assertion leads to the question of the difference between the impacts of climate or 
weather related hazards within a conflict situation and outside of a conflict situation. In 
other words: what difference does conflict make? Literature from disaster studies and 
political ecology suggests that conflict may exacerbate the impacts of extreme climate or 
weather (Wisner et al. 2004; Watts and Bohle, 1993). However, other studies suggest that 
conflict may be worsened by the impacts of extreme weather (Buckley et al 2010; Card 
and Darl, 2011; Cervellati et al. 2011). This presents both a temporal and spatial scale 
issue. At what time scale can we justify a causal relationship and at what scale is this 
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justifiable? There is no doubt that Hsiang et al. (2014) and Hsiang and Burke (2014) 
downplay the issue of scale in their analysis. 
Context is extremely important in conflict studies but also seems to have been 
completely ignored in the two studies. In their argument for the situated nature of 
conflict, Nordstrom and Robben (1995:4) assert that: 
[…] Violence is slippery; it escapes easy definitions and enters the most 
fundamental features of people’s lives. Violence is formative; it shapes peoples 
perceptions of who they are and what they are fighting for across space and time – 
a continual dynamic that forges as well as affects identities.      
Researchers must therefore ask, for example, how robust and rigorous it is to compare a 
bar fight or fights over the results of a football match in the United States with organized 
political violence with sets of grievances and demands for different groups such as in 
Somalia or regional conflicts such as the Arab Spring or even more recently, Ukraine? 
According to Salehyan (2008), violence is rarely, if ever, spontaneous but arises out of 
choices made by actors who often perceive available institutions as grievance channels as 
incapable of resolving their conflicts in a peaceful manner. He argues that conflict is not a 
strategic choice in dealing with scarcity because of its destructive nature and the fact that 
it often leaves conflict groups worse off than they begun. Also, and even more 
importantly, conflict is not the only option at any given time in dealing with issues of 
resource scarcity and redistribution. This is especially so given that conflict may not 
redistribute resources rather it may in certain cases form the foundation of a political 
intervention to redistribute or not. For instance, institutional change may be effected to 
redistribute resources without necessarily resulting in violence and this may be even more 
strategic in ensuring broader legitimacy in redistribution therefore ensuring a certain level 
of protection and right. 
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 Furthermore, Eriksen and Lind (2009) argue that, for local communities in many 
parts of Africa, conflict forms part of local adaptive capacity, which is related to claims 
of reciprocity and social networks in time of increased vulnerability. In such 
circumstances, conflict is a means of influencing adaptation outcomes, and is related to 
political, business, and law enforcement institutions in these places. On the other hand, 
cooperation, even within a context of deep seated conflicts and tensions, during periods 
of climate stress may threaten local social institutions that depend upon both conflict and 
conflict resolution. Both conflict and adaptation have uneven outcomes and vary in 
context. Perhaps researchers need to ask the question: what particular role does conflict 
play as a climate response strategy? With that, it is difficult to see how larger conflicts 
such as civil or interstate wars or even smaller interpersonal conflicts may be caused by 
changes in the climate.    
 One of the arguments in the studies relied upon in this synthesis is based on the 
temperature-aggression hypothesis but if indeed people are more aggressive when its too 
hot or too cold, do they become easier to mobilize for larger political causes or is that the 
case when the weather is pleasant as some literature (Mares, 2013) suggests? Would it be 
easier to mobilize individuals and groups towards a conflict whose political basis they do 
not agree just because of variations in temperature? Recent critical studies (Scheffran et 
al. 2012b; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012) suggest that local level conflicts over resource 
access may be more related to climate impacts than other types of conflict such as civil 
wars which require a lot more organizing, manipulation, money, and political will. But 
even though some of these resource-related conflicts may be influenced by factors that 
may have to do with variations in precipitation and/or temperature, many are rooted in 
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historical, territorial, and cultural factors that may not be affected by climate or whose 
relationship with variations in the weather may not be untangled from sociopolitical 
factors. 
 The nature of climate variables used in climate-conflict research and their 
temporal and spatial scales also need to be evaluated. For example, long term studies on 
precipitation and temperature and their impact on resource availability and access may 
miss proximate factors that may influence conflict (Hendrix and Glasser, 2007; Scheffran 
et al. 2012a; Theisen, 2012). This is because there may exist other underlying issues 
surrounding resource tenure and ownership that are exceptionally context dependent and 
not attributable to one causal mechanism. Also the most comprehensive and widely used 
temperature and precipitation datasets such as the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) (CRU 
TS 3.1; Mitchell et al., 2004)) and the NCEP/NCAR Reanalysis (Kalnay et al. 1996) 
dataset are based on observed and numerical models that may not be appropriate for 
subnational and local scales of analysis especially for regions with a sparse coverage of 
observation data. 
 Climate and weather: Climate and the weather are physically and statistically 
related but imply different temporal and spatial scales. In their synthesis studies, Hsiang 
et al. (2013) do not define important concepts that constitute the core of their argument. 
For instance, the authors do not explain what climatologically or meteorologically 
constitutes weather, climate, or even climate change and to what extent that applies to 
their study. This would be particularly essential because the datasets they rely on 
encompass a wide array of spatial and temporal scales. More importantly, there seems to 
be an assumption in both Hsiang et al. (2013) and Hsiang and Burke (2014) that weather 
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and climate can be used interchangeably or constitute the same thing and therefore the 
temporal and spatial scope of their variables need not be explained. Combining the 
effects of weather events that are more short-term (minutes, hours to days) with climate 
events that may constitute weather events averaged over longer time scales (months, 
seasons, to years, even to millennia) has the potential to exaggerate the relationship 
between variables. This is even more important when any change in these variables is 
equated to change in climate. 
 The findings of these two studies are also inconsistent with both conflict and 
climate trends observed for different regions over the recent decades. For instance, 
Buhaug (2010) responding to Burke et al. (2009) notes that general temperature trends in 
Africa indicate that temperatures have increased in the last 30 years but the occurrence of 
civil war has declined. He asserts that, “[…] temperature is statistically insignificant 
when added to standard models of civil war.” Also, it may be important to note that 
recent studies, including some synthesized in Hsiang et al. (2013), on the relationship 
between climate and conflict variables have tended to return different results for 
temperature and precipitation with anomalously dry or wet precipitation conditions 
returning a positive relationship with conflict (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Dell et al. 
2012; Fjelde et al. 2012). 
   The quest for causation: The quest for causality in climate-conflict studies has 
in the last decade gained prominence especially in the disciplines of political science and 
economics. Many studies have attempted to disentangle climate from the multiple causal 
pathways that may characterize a causal mechanism in a climate conflict-relationship 
(Buhaug, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006; O’Loughlin, et al. 2012). However, many have also 
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acknowledged that the relationship between climate and conflict is ambivalent (Scheffran 
et al. 2012b; Adano et al. 2012; Theisen, 2012; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Peluso and 
Watts, 2001) while others argue that environmental factors may not be associated with 
conflict outside of sociopolitical and economic factors (Hendrix and Glasser, 2007; 
Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007). In the recent studies by Hsiang et al. (2013) and Hsiang and 
Burke (2014), the failure to differentiate between important scientific concepts such as 
climate, weather, and climate change and the failure to sufficiently address the issues of 
scale and context produce an overly exaggerated causation argument. 
 An important question about quantitative studies in the climate-conflict debate 
should be whether the quest for causation should be in the interest of explaining 
relationships between variables or for the mere agenda of proving that a causal link 
exists. Hsiang and Burke (2013:) claim to use a “standard definition” of causation that 
allows them “[…] to infer causality through quantitative measurements even if the 
detailed pathway linking a cause to its effect is not fully understood.” In their conclusion, 
however, they claim to have found strong linkages between conflict, climate, and societal 
stability, which are of immense policy interest. The implication of this assertion in their 
conclusion is the creation of a strong narrative of the causal link between climate and 
conflict in order to influence policy but with a subtle acknowledgement that the link is 
not fully understood. The broader implication of this is the furtherance of a distorted 
discourse on the understanding of the relationship between climate and conflict that leads 
to bad policy. 
 Ignoring critical theoretical understandings of the relationship between conflict 
and climate in furtherance of a thin causative argument is misleading and unhelpful. 
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Hsiang’s empirical studies overlook sixty years of development and anthropology 
research on the subject and have the potential to take us back to the era of functionalist 
models of human behavior. What Hsiang misconstrues for a relationship between 
temperature and conflict is a distribution of institutional capacity to deal with conflict, 
disease, poverty and other factors that may destabilize society. In other words, their 
analysis is flawed because it misses an institutional analysis leading to an uncritical and 
ahistorical pursuance of causation. Their analysis reminded me of a joke my statistics 
professor used to tell us about pregnancy tests in hospitals. The joke went something like: 
the high correlation between the female sex and pregnancy should not be misconstrued to 
mean that being female causes you to get pregnant. Yet Hsiang’s studies suggest that 
increased temperatures cause people to engage in conflict while ignoring all variables that 
may intervene such a causal relationship, the multiple pathways in which such a causal 
mechanism operates, and all the theoretical problems that such an approach portends.     
 Avoiding existing theory on the relationship between climate and conflict, and 
choosing a purely empirical analysis is convenient for Hsiang and his co-authors in at 
least two important ways: One, the two studies are able to avoid known epistemological 
nuances associated with the many datasets that they deal with. By choosing to deal with 
numbers and avoiding known dataset issues, they are able to evade potential questions 
that may arise from each dataset they use. For example, one may question the utility of 
using civil war data in the same study as lab experiments from psychological and/or 
medical tests. Two, they are able to avoid the inconvenience of dealing with institutional 
capacity data and therefore to some extent justify the glaring omission of a typology of 
conflict and the situatedness of any single conflict. This allows them to generalize all 
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conflicts (whether violent or non-violent, interstate or personal) into one class that they 
do not substantively define. 
Conclusion 	  
 Critical and empirical human-environment studies indicate that environmental 
change, and particularly climate change, will result in major disruptions to both social 
and ecological systems (Satapathy et al. 2014; Sign et al. 2014; Arnell et al. 2013; IPCC, 
2014). Such changes, it has been argued, may increase the vulnerability of livelihoods 
and undermine human security by reducing the availability, access, and quality of key 
resources that sustain livelihoods (IPCC, 2014; Brown et al 2013; Wangui et al. 2012; 
Hsiang et al. 2011; Barnett and Adger, 2007). In turn, some have argued, the increased 
competition for reduced access to natural resources due to environmental change coupled 
with a changing political economy of resource access may result in an increase in the risk 
of conflict (IPCC, 2014; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Butler and Gates, 2012; Hendrix and 
Salehyan, 2012). This realization has led to a heightened attention in academic and policy 
circles on questions relating to the relationship between climate and conflict in recent 
years.  
 Recent advances in data collection methods and the availability of large amounts of 
data have made it possible for researchers to create “rigorous” quantitative models to 
explain and predict conflict trends without engaging in the time consuming and often 
expensive qualitative data collection. However, the problems associated with results from 
these models are many, especially in conflict studies, partly because conflict is situated, it 
is a lived experience, it is a social relation, and it also defines the identities of people 
living in those particular places. Some of these recent quantitative studies that employ 
	   35	  
multiple datasets (Hsiang et al. 2013; Hsiang and Burke, 2014) completely miss an 
institutional analysis and therefore do not account for the role of institutions in the 
process and outcome of conflict. Such studies also ignore that conflict has uneven 
outcomes (Eriksen and Lind; 2009) for different groups in different places and this has an 
effect on whether conflicts are resolved, exacerbated, recur, or not. An even more 
important omission is a failure to explain the role of institutions in redistributing 
resources especially given that these recent climate-conflict debates have been dominated 
by arguments around resource availability, access, and quality (IPCC, 2014; Hsiang et al. 
2013; Barnett and Adger, 2007).   
 Conflicts rarely, if ever, by themselves redistribute resources. We must thus 
recognize that whether conflicts turn violent, are exacerbated, or resolved, recur or not is 
heavily influenced by the capacity of available institutions and the perceptions of conflict 
groups on the process and outcome of the immediate as well as of past conflicts. By 
ignoring an institutional and historical analysis in pursuit of a narrow causality between 
climate variables and conflict, Hsiang’s studies tell us little about conflict. In addition, the 
focus on environmental factors as trigger mechanisms for conflict leads to misleading 
arguments about conflict distribution and frequency, allows researchers to shift attention 
from differing institutional capacities, and ultimately hinders the understanding of 
conflict and mediation. This approach has the potential to lead to militaristic 
interventionist policies rather than policies aimed at building and strengthening 
institutions, and supporting mitigation and adaptation strategies that bolster livelihoods so 
that they are more responsive to the effects of both current and future climate impacts.  
 The increased focus on the relationship between climate change and conflict has 
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refocused both the debates and discourse on conflict from a debate about the causes of 
conflict and potential avenues for mediation and resolution to one about how climate may 
affect conflict trends and ultimately to a debate about climatic impacts on human 
security. The concept of human security as defined by the Working Group II of the IPCC 
2014 Report seems to include all livelihood aspects and therefore is too broad to permit 
the sharpening of any substantive analytical connection between conflict and climate 
change. Furthermore, there was divided opinion among scientists over the relationship 
between conflict and climate change. Interestingly, the chapter ended up suggesting that 
although the relationship was not proven, its impacts are clearly a threat to human 
security. The challenge for climate-conflict researchers thus remains in establishing what 
particular role conflict may play as a climate response strategy and what types of conflict 
may be considered part of adaptation if any. If conflict can indeed be part of adaptation, 
its negative impacts on adaptation must also be elucidated because it has the potential to 
generate “losers” and provide grievances that may lead to further conflicts. The role of the 
state as an institution in providing social safety nets and diversification options (Scoones, 
2009) through innovation and economic inclusion as well as conflict mediation and 
resolution is also a critical area that needs more research.  
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CHAPTER 3: BETWEEN THE LEGAL AND THE 
CUSTOMARY: INFORMAL LAND TRANSFERS AND 
CONTESTED CLAIMS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The transformation of African economies in the last three decades has led to a 
rapid change in social relations around land allocation and tenure in varying degrees 
across the continent. This paper examines the ongoing transition from customary land 
ownership systems to formal private property regimes in Africa and how that transition 
has benefitted or disenfranchised certain groups. Using a case study from Njukini in 
Southern Kenya, I illustrate a system of informal land transfers that do not fit the 
categories of formal property ownership or customary law that exists in policy and laws 
on land in Kenya. Transfers or sales that do not involve either immediate formal title 
change or accepted customary processes characterize these informal land transfers but 
which are locally accepted as legitimate pre-titling processes. This study also illustrates 
how the existence of a dual system of land adjudication coupled with an expensive and 
bureaucratic land titling process in Kenya produces and maintains this unregulated 
informal transfer system. I argue that these unregulated systems may help circumvent 
protections provided within law and policy since no mechanism exists to track the chain 
of exchange until the land is finally formally titled. This study utilizes qualitative methods 
and a survey to provide a historical basis and an in-depth analysis of land relations and 
land conflict in Njukini.   
Keywords: Land, conflict, property rights, claims, customary, tenure, title 
 
Solomon, M. Between the legal and the customary: Informal land transfers and contested 
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Introduction 
 
 Land adjudication in Africa has been an important area of both research and 
policy since the colonial period. Major areas of focus have changed through time and 
have differed from country to country and even within countries (Peters, 2013; Berry, 
1993; Chanock, 1991; Amir, 1976). This is attributed to the multiplicity of tenure regimes 
within the continent and the differing approaches to land policy. Recent research has 
continually placed more emphasis on the negotiability of customary land tenure and 
context specific analyses in cognizance of recent trends towards increased formalization 
in Africa (Santos and Fletschner, 2014; Peters, 2013; Colin, 2013). Increased attention 
has been given to those groups that are likely to be disenfranchised by trends towards 
more titling especially women and the youth (Colin, 2013; Toulmin, 2008; Joireman, 
2008; Mwangi, 2007). However, whether within the context of customary communal 
ownership or modern private property land tenure arrangements, there appears to be 
consensus that similar losers and beneficiaries exist. According to Woodhouse (2003), 
customary tenure is neither a hindrance to economic development nor is it a secure 
economic safety net for poor households. Consequently, customary tenure and the 
negotiability debate may fundamentally obscure, even silence, vulnerable groups by 
masking them within the discourse of the negotiability of rights.  
A challenge to researchers is to examine and establish to what extent the 
ambiguity of rights guarantee any sort of advantage over formal private ownership to 
disenfranchised groups within customary tenure and in some forms of informal transfer 
especially given that informal transfers may sometimes lead to conflict and economic 
loss? I examine this question in both literature and research, and argue that in areas with 
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high demand for land and where modern property relations are the norm, community 
access to private land obscures the power dynamics of ownership and may sometimes 
hide the fact that the land in question can be fenced off and rights or privileges withdrawn 
forthwith by owners. Even in cases where land has been transferred or sold informally by 
way of local recognized institutions, the understanding must always be that it will not 
revert back to the community unless there is a conflict. Informal transfers, however 
chaotic, exist largely in places with precedence and recognition for private ownership and 
may be viewed as a longer route towards titling. 
In the following sections, I delve into these perspectives in both discourse and 
context in an effort to contribute to the continuing debates about land allocation and 
tenure, conflict, and capital formation in Africa. First, I trace the origins of modern 
conceptions of land tenure in Africa and examine critically the concept of negotiability 
and how it relates to recent trends in capital formation and land conflicts in Africa. 
Secondly, I examine the issue of informal land transfers, the reasons they are pervasive in 
many areas where land is in high demand, why they might provide an easier ground to 
marginalization of certain groups as an unregulated pre-titling process. Third, I put the 
aforementioned issues in context and provide evidence through a case study in Njukini, 
Taveta, in Southeast Kenya. Through this analysis, I show that negotiability does not 
necessarily guarantee any advantage over formal tenure to disenfranchised groups since 
in the absence of policy and a formal legal framework to address these “negotiable” 
rights, local power relations which disenfranchised certain groups are likely to 
overwhelmingly prevail in the process of formal titling where land is in high demand. I 
argue that in the context of rapidly changing social relations around land and especially 
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where land is in high demand, formal policies and statutory laws are more effective in 
addressing problems associated with access rights for disenfranchised groups. In addition, 
informal land transfers may provide avenues for circumventing the laws and policies that 
address inequality therefore the process of titling should be simplified and inexpensive.  
The evolution of land tenure studies in Africa 	  
Colonial land tenure policies and research placed emphasis on collective 
ownership and the role of local authorities and institutions in land allocation.  Peters 
(2009:1317) argues “[…] under the colonial administration, the multiple types of 
authority and sets of claims over land and its products were glossed as communal tenure, 
which became incorporated into the developing body of customary law”. Extensive 
research in this field shows that colonial conceptions of communal ownership based on 
customary law were transmogrifications of pre-colonial modes of land allocation and 
transfer (Peters, 2013; Bernstein, 2010; Berry, 2002; Chanock, 1991). These conceptions 
invalidated the existence of individual private ownership in many parts of Africa, which 
the colonists considered superior to communal forms of landholding. Research has also 
shown that these positions were largely guided by entrenched Eurocentric conceptions of 
land allocation and tenure (Peters, 2009; Chanock, 1991). In addition, materialist 
analyses have also demonstrated that the alteration of pre-colonial land tenure regimes 
was aimed at transforming labor relations in the colonies to align them with the broader 
capitalist colonial project (Bernstein, 2010; Mamdani, 1996; Amin, 1976). This was done 
in order to make colonies to pay for themselves and ease the pressure of the colonial 
mission from the colonial states. 
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 Later research and policy during the post-colonial and development era focused 
on streamlining land tenancy contracts to conform with global capitalist trends to increase 
productivity while also making sure that land as a commodity could be used as capital, 
especially in securing credit. One of the most notable researchers associated with the 
ideas of this period was Hernando De Soto. According to De Soto (2000), the 
commodification of land and other property is essential for capital formation and poverty 
reduction. This idea was in line with policy and proposals by development agencies such 
as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) towards land 
reform in developing countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In this school of 
thought, researchers argue that clearly defined rights of ownership and transfer of 
property, including land, encourage investment while ambiguity of rights and/or lack of 
enforcement may hinder investment and stifle economic growth (Fukuyama, 2004; 
Robinson, Acemoglu, and Johnson, 2004; De Soto, 2000). This thinking led to policies 
that encouraged the privatization of land and formalization of land transfers in many 
developing countries, especially in Africa, where such practices were either nonexistent 
or existed only on a small scale in certain regions (Peters, 2009; Woodhouse, 2003). This 
policy push by development agencies has slowed down in the last two decades in favor of 
more context specific policies.    
 The change from an insistence on privatization of rights to more context specific 
approaches was largely informed by new research that suggested that universalist 
approaches towards the formalization of land tenure could potentially disenfranchise 
certain groups within communities by cementing inequalities and even cause conflicts in 
some cases (Colin, 2013; Joireman, 2008; Mwangi, 2007; Berry, 2002). In addition, there 
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existed little evidence that formalization necessarily led to increased productivity and 
access to capital (Grimm and Lesorogol, 2012; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008; Joireman, 
2008). Research has demonstrated that although clear and enforced private property 
rights may lead to less conflicts over ownership and improve people’s lives, they do not 
necessarily guarantee the availability of capital (Peters, 2013; Sjaastad and Cousins, 
2008; Woodhouse, 2003). Furthermore, the negotiability of access rights to land 
resources may provide continued access to certain groups within communities that do not 
necessarily have the power of ownership (Peters, 2013). Other researchers (Santos and 
Fletschner, 2014; Colin, 2013; Mainzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2008; Woodhouse, 2003) add 
that, although the formalization of land tenure seems to be the development trend in 
many countries in Africa, there should be efforts to address the complex and dynamic 
‘web of interests’ in the land resource before the issuance of formal title of ownership.     
Negotiability, capital formation, and conflict 	  
 “[…] Conflict centered on land has increased in incidence and severity as land 
 values  rise, patterns of land acquisition become more commercialized, land 
 becomes more concentrated, and disputes and litigation over competing rights 
 proliferate.” (Peters,  2013)  
 In many countries in Africa, land and other property rights may be subject to both 
customary and statutory law (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008; Joireman, 2007; Bruce and 
Mighot-Adholla, 1994). For example, although statutory law takes precedence over any 
other law in Kenya, customary law and other local institutions may adjudicate on certain 
matters and especially pertaining communal or family property. The courts are 
consequently expected to recognize the decisions of these institutions although aggrieved 
parties may still contest the said decisions in statutory court. Some scholars argue that the 
existence of multiple sets of law in many African countries can be advantageous to 
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communities especially due to the various customs and livelihood systems (Santos and 
Fletschner, 2014; Joireman, 2008; Mwangi, 2007). They argue that the formalization of 
tenure will deny ownership and use rights to women and the youth who form the most 
agriculturally productive groups in developing countries especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. For example, Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi (2008) found that the formalization of 
land ownership curtailed women’s use rights and autonomy in decision-making 
associated with agricultural production while also diminishing social networks and 
traditional social safety nets among pastoralist communities in Kenya. Research has also 
shown that the commodification of land has not led to increased agricultural production 
or even access to credit (Peters, 2009; Joireman, 2008). According to Sjaastad and 
Cousins (2008), increased formalization has in some cases resulted in land speculation in 
certain areas.  
 Yet we have to be careful not to fall into the trap of rural ‘peasant essentialism’ 
and the ‘agrarian myth’ given the glaring evidence of rapid transformation of rural 
livelihoods and the current trends in favor of privatization. Brass (2001:1) argues that 
“[…] there has been an analogous shift in development debate about agrarian 
transformation, from ‘peasantness’-as-economic-alienation to ‘peasantness’-as-cultural-
empowerment” which caries the danger of creating a discourse that reinforces practices 
that were advantageous to traditional peasant societies but are incompatible with the 
challenges of a modern capitalist economy. According to Brass, “[…] the agrarian myth 
is a discourse about the desirability/feasibility and ‘naturalness’ of small-scale economic 
activity” that supports cultural economic institutions and perceived connections to nature. 
We therefore have to ask ourselves why these discourses endure even with recognition of 
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the dynamic nature of social relations under capitalism. According to Mitchel (2000), a 
people’s believes, attitudes, and values are usually influenced by their prevailing social 
and material conditions. Mitchel’s assertion is a Marxian one,  
 “[...] It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but their social 
 existence that determines their consciousness”. (Marx, 1970: 21) 
 
It is thus critical for us to recognize that capitalist continues to influence social relations 
in rural Africa and has affected the transformation of livelihoods and the economic 
choices of both governments and rural communities. Woodhouse (2003) argues that 
increasing commodification of land and individualization of access to land and other 
natural resources such as watering areas may be considered the prevailing economic and 
social change in many regions of Africa and especially where the value of land has been 
growing.  
 The transition to capitalism and the existence of dual sets of law on land tenure 
have to a large extent influenced the way land and land-based resources are negotiated 
(Turner, 2004; Basset, 1988). This has in turn affected the role of local informal 
(traditional) and formal institutions in resource allocation and mediating conflicts arising 
from local land issues (Lesorogol et al. 2013; Grimm and Lesorogol, 2012; Peters, 2009; 
Homewood et al. 2009). Although resource conflicts among different groups in Africa 
existed even in the pre-colonial period, it is widely accepted in this area of research that 
the transition to capitalism through privatization of natural resources by colonial and post 
colonial states continues to provide avenues for grievance thus exacerbating conflicts 
(Toulmin, 2008; Robot and Peluso, 2003; Schroeder, 1999; Berry, 2002). According to 
Ribot and Peluso, law, whether customary or statutory, is insufficient in delineating “[...] 
all the modes and pathways of resource access along complex and overlapping webs of 
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power” (2003:156). Consequently, modern property relations are generally not how 
resource claims are made; rather, what exists is a series of access claims about who gains 
and maintains access to resources at different times and across multiple scales (Sikor and 
Lund, 2009; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In her examination of land acquisitions and conflict 
in Africa, Peters (2013:544) concludes “[…] while relations around land have long been 
central to political economy, culture, and society across the continent, their greater 
salience today in intensifying struggles among actors…has direct consequences for 
competition over authority at all levels of society, and for competing definitions of 
property, ownership, and citizenship.” Of great importance is therefore an analysis of 
how these often-competing centers of power at both the local and the national scale and 
their interfaces affect resource governance and whether the ambiguities created by the 
dual legal-institutional regime is more advantageous for the poor in the longer term than 
having clearly defined and enforced property rights. 
 Recent research on land tenure in Africa has focused on ways of securing land 
transfers to ensure they are inclusive (Santos and Fletschner, 2014), protect vulnerable 
groups (Toulmin, 2008; Mwangi, 2007), and prevent conflict (Peters, 2013; Colin, 2013). 
There seems to be consensus that lack of one coherent law on land allocation in many 
countries in Africa is a major cause for contested claims to land, which may result to 
conflict. Other factors that hinder smooth transfers in countries that have already started 
formalizing land ownership include long bureaucratic processes, high transfer costs, and 
lack of up to date documentation which in turn result to a movement towards informal 
transfers. Although these informal transfers are expected to be the first step towards 
formal tenure, they often lead to conflicts especially if the correct procedures are not 
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followed. In the next section, I examine informal transfers and show how these transfers 
may cement inequalities and create conflict in the absence of clear regulatory 
mechanisms.  
Informal land transfers: Private property or provisional rights? 	  
 Informal land transfers are especially common in areas where some level of land 
formalization has taken place or in places where land is in high demand (Peters, 2009). 
The process of land transfer involves a transaction, an exchange between the buyer or 
leaser and the seller to which the land is either formally registered or is informally 
recognized as the rightful owner of the said parcel. Land transactions between private 
owners must therefore assume the existence of a private ownership regime and formal or 
informal rules that guide such a process. In Kenya, for example, the National Land Policy 
(NLP) outlines different types of land and addresses critical issues of land administration 
and transfer in line with the Land Act of 2012. Both the NLP and the Land Act provide 
guidelines on the process of land transfer from the point of exchange (transaction 
between willing seller/s and willing buyer/s) until the land is formally transferred to a 
new owner by the registrar of lands. Even in cases where the seller does not own a formal 
title, the general process of transfer is similar. Yet it is at this point of transfer where 
access is won and lost. In this section, I examine the land transaction at the point of 
exchange and argue that informal transfers (legal or illegal) may facilitate the 
disempowerment of certain groups of society and especially where land ownership has 
changed many times without the issuance of formal title. 
 Peters (2013) asserts that conflicts over land are sites of crises over the meaning 
of and access to property, belonging, and the place of past systems in modern struggles 
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over resource distribution and governance. As capitalism transforms the livelihoods of 
rural communities in Africa, so do the social relations that govern property access. In 
some cases, informal land transfers may be illegal i.e. what Peters (2013) calls ‘informal 
formalization’ but in other cases, they may be recognized as part of the process of land 
acquisition which is expected to eventually culminate in the acquisition of formal title or 
the transfer of informal rights of private ownership. Research has shown that informal 
land transfers are rampant in Africa and may be as a result of costs associated with the 
process of formal title acquisition (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008) rather than a prevailing 
preference towards informal or traditional modes of exchange. This may be attributed to 
high costs like in the case of Kenya (Joireman, 2008), preference to informal less 
bureaucratic and less expensive forms of transfer (Peters, 2009), or issues associated with 
relations around land and kinship, identity, place, and belonging (Peters, 2013). Although 
the relations between parties in this arrangement are complex and vary from place to 
place, informal transfers in many cases suggest an arrangement that may not go back to 
communal ownership. The process of informal transfer presupposes a process of 
exchange, commodity exchange. It can therefore be assumed that the individual or group 
on the commodity side of the exchange possesses a level of exclusive rights to the land 
commodity being exchanged. In that case we could argue that informal transfers can only 
happen where there exist a certain level of private property at the individual or group 
level. 
It is important to distinguish between access and control or ownership in the 
context of property relations in many parts of Africa. Communal access may be allowed 
or expected in some contexts in Africa even when land resources are privately owned and 
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controlled. Research has shown that in some parts of Africa individual ownership existed 
in the pre-colonial and during the colonial era but this did not always exclude communal 
access to resources. Tiffen and Mortimore (1992) examine a case study in Machakos 
Kenya and illustrate the levels of land ownership to land that existed among members of 
the Akamba community during the pre-colonial and the colonial period. Through their 
case study, they argue that land access among traditional Kamba communities included 
private ownership rights for both cultivated and grazing land but communal access was 
allowed on privately owned grazing areas and in some cases cultivated land. They also 
show that informal transfers were prevalent although rights to properly were regulated by 
traditional customary rules.  
In many parts of Africa, privately owned land, including titled land may be open 
to communal use and access especially for critical resources such as water and grazing 
land but that does not make it community property. Owners of privately held land may 
allow their relatives, neighbors or friends to, for example, graze their cattle freely in 
unused land. However, they maintain the right and sometimes the power to restrict or 
block access although that may affect the relations between them and those who would 
want or need access. This may be different from the western concept of property 
common, in Africa, in places where land is scarce and/or in high demand where rules 
exist against trespassing and other forms of access. However, Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 
(2008) assert that there is evidence of increased conflicts over trespassing in private lands 
that were formerly Maasai group ranches in Kajiado District, which is an important 
illustration of the rapid change in social relations around land in rural Africa. It has to be 
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understood that social relations around land are just part of larger relations and contracts 
that bind communities in these places.  
 Recent research points towards substantial progress in the formulation of policy 
on land tenure and a movement towards more inclusive land tenure regimes. In addition, 
the level of success or failure in land reform in Africa seems to vary with context with 
recent attempts seemingly more successful than older ones (Santos and Fletschner, 2014). 
For instance, while early attempts on land reform in Kenya and Ivory Coast seem to have 
largely disenfranchised certain groups and cemented inequalities (Santos and Fletschner, 
2014; Colin, 2013), later attempts in Rwanda and Tanzania seem to have been more 
inclusive and largely successful in addressing inequality (Santos and Fletschner, 2014; 
Daley, 2008). The relative success in Tanzania and Rwanda may be attributed to the 
creation of a regulatory framework that recognizes the rights of individuals and groups 
that may not be included in the title by allocating them powers to secure their interests at 
the time of sale, exchange, or transfer. These powers may be exercised during land 
transfer to allow or veto the said transfer. Yet these groups may not be able to effectively 
exercise their rights in cases where informal transfers happen in the absence of title. 
Informal transfers continue to happen in places where land has never been titled and 
customary practices continue to influence who benefits from rights over land. The 
ambiguity of rights for certain individuals and groups such as the youth, wives, and 
unmarried women in these cases therefore serve as a stumbling block for them to exercise 
the rights conferred upon them by formal policy or statutory law. In addition, in situations 
where private land has changed ownership many times without the issuance of formal 
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title, it may be impossible to ascertain whether due diligence as per formal procedures 
was followed for past transfers thus permanently cementing inequality.  
Data and Methods 	  
 In order for me to address the issue of informal transfers and how they may stifle 
progress in addressing inequality through regulating land transactions, I chose a case 
study in Kenya that fits three major criteria. First, I chose a case study that has undergone 
drastic changes in population, economy, and politics from the colonial period up to date. 
This is important in establishing a historical social and material context that current 
relations around land allocation and tenure are rooted. Secondly, this case study is in a 
high-land-demand area but the majority of households living in this area do not have 
formal title deeds for their land although all the land is formally administered as either 
private, government, or public. This second criteria allows me to illustrate how informal 
transfers may, even with the existence of regulatory safeguards for vulnerable groups, 
cement inequality especially because they are difficult to trace. In addition, informal 
transfers are often sites of conflicts. Thirdly, this case study is a microcosm of the 
socioeconomic practices in the region and more broadly in Africa, which allows for 
broader generalization and comparison. The major socioeconomic activities in this area 
include: irrigated agriculture, pastoralism, non-irrigated arid mixed farming, casual labor, 
and large-scale farming among other activities. 
 This study was conducted in the summer of 2010 and relies on qualitative 
methods and a household survey for descriptive statistics. Qualitative methods were used 
to capture local people’s perceptions about land access and ownership, land transactions, 
and the dynamics of land access and local institutional governance. Four primary data 
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collection methods were utilized, namely: forty-two key informant interviews, a 
community workshop comprising twelve elders, and fifty household surveys. The 
composition of the community workshop was based on the period of time individuals had 
spent in the area and was well balanced to address gender issues. Key informant 
interviews comprised of nineteen women and twenty-three men while the surveys were 
conducted on whoever was home between the husband and the wife although in many 
cases wives would prefer the husbands to answer the questions if both were present. In 
cases where both spouses were available, all were encouraged to participate. The 
purposes of these research methods were to examine local resource governance issues 
through an examination of patterns of power and right among different groups and 
institutions. Through the exploration of the social relations of property ownership and 
access, I was also able to establish the drivers of land conflicts and inequalities in the 
transfer and access to land and land-based resources. I utilized a qualitative thematic 
analysis method to explore qualitative data and simple descriptive statistics obtained from 
the survey to explain research results.  
 All the textual data derived from the various methods was first coded thematically 
using descriptive codes. Nvivo software was used to organize the text data into 
descriptive codes. Examples of descriptive codes included: “kamati” (committees), 
“viongozi” (leaders), “violence” (mapigano), “population” (idadi ya watu), “land” 
(shamba), “pasture” (malisho ya mifugo), “water” (maji), “farms” (mashamba), 
“drought” (kiangazi – although Kiangazi can also mean the dry season), “food” 
(chakula), “climate” (Hali ya hewa) and “rainfall” (mvua). I then developed analytic 
codes, which were based on an interpretation of the text and descriptive codes,to reflect 
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key themes of the research and dig deeper into the data. I also generated some analytic 
codes from the literature. Analytic codes included but were not limited to: “usimamizi” 
(governance), “ethnic divisions” (migawanyiko ya kikabila), “generational issues” (rika), 
“youth unemployment” (ukosefu wa kazi kwa vijana), “population density” (wingi wa 
watu), “contested claims” (madai yanayotofautiana), and “perceptions of right” 
(mitazamo ya haki). After developing satisfactory codes, descriptive and analytic codes 
were grouped together according to substantive relationships and conceptual links so as 
to make them easier to manage and analyze. 
 The result of this data analysis included a list of words and themes, and the 
number of times each was used. These were then ranked in order to generate a 
prioritization of factors that undelie of land relations and conflict. The data analysis also 
developed a matrix of word and theme relationships. For instance, if the words “land” 
(ardhi/mashamba) and “water” (maji) were voiced together frequently, that would help 
explain exactly which environmental resources underlie a land conflict. If the words 
“land conflict” (migogoro inayohusiana na ardhi/mashamba) and “people from outside” 
(wahamiaji) wee spoken frequently, then that would indicate a socio-political context to 
land conflict. Through the generation of such a word and thematic matrix, I was able to 
substantiate my observations and thus ensure that the qualitative data is truly empirical. 
Survey data was uploaded into the SPSS statistical software where simple statistics and 
tables were generated to help explain themes developed through the qualitative analysis. 
 
	   53	  
Njukini: A space of land contestation and conflict 
	  
Figure 1: Map of Study Area (Njukini) 
 	  
Njukini presents a microcosm of dryland areas in East Africa. It encompasses the 
primary livelihood types and economic activities found in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid 
zones. Njukini also marks a transitional zone between the pastoral areas of Loitoktok to 
the north, the sisal plantations of Taveta, and the Taita hills and Kilimanjaro gradients, 
which rise out of the savanna and are host to intensive irrigated smallholder farming 
systems. It is sandwiched between the Kenya/Tanzania border on the South and the 
Tsavo West game reserve to the NE. Njukini is located in the leeward side of Mt 
Kilimanjaro in the lower and drier lowland gradient of the mountain in the Kenyan side. 
It has a population of 18,025 people according to the 2009 census (KNBS, 2010). The 
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area is characterized by erratic unreliable rainfall that varies greatly and has two rainy 
seasons. The short rains, known as Vuli, in the local languages (Oct-Jan) are more 
reliable than the long rains known locally as Masika (March-May) (Mutai et al. 2011) 
 Njukini’s history and settlement makes it much ethnically diverse compared to 
many other rural dryland areas in Kenya. The settlement history represents change and 
diversity and this has largely shaped resource access patterns in the area. The area that is 
now Njukini was a protected government water catchment area and was hardly inhabited 
during the colonial period. Both Taveta and Maasai communities claim historical 
territorial rights. However, although it was a government protected area where settlement 
was prohibited; influential people in the post-colonial government acquired large sections 
of it to practice large-scale sisal and maize farming. This was part of widespread abuse of 
presidential discretion through land grabbing (Southall, 2005) by powerful people within 
the postcolonial Kenyan state. However, it is important to mention that the Ndung’u 
Report, a report of a commission of enquiry appointed by president Mwai Kibaki to look 
into the issue of land grabbing and land allocation in Kenya concluded that these large 
farms had been acquired legally, a sentiment that local research participants did not share.   
 Interviews with local residents and leaders suggest four major waves of migration 
into Njukini. The areas from which the communities migrated are distinct in time period, 
area settled within the study area, ethnic composition, perception of rights or power of 
claim to land and water resources in the area, and in some cases the names of the places 
they settled. For example, those who migrated from Tanzania in the mid 1970s during the 
crisis that led to the collapse of the East Africa community (EAC) tended to name their 
villages after the Ujamaa village from which they migrated. The first group of settlers in 
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Njukini was those who migrated into the area after independence in 1963 from the 
Tanzanian side of the border because they wanted to be part of the new republic of 
Kenya. Most of these settlers were Akamba and settled just across the border so as to 
maintain their social networks across the border in Tanzania. The second group 
comprises of those who moved to Njukini in the late 1960s to work in large-scale sisal 
estates owned by the family of the first president and a Greek settler. These settlers were 
of different origins and ethnicities. According to interviews with residents of Irrigation 
village in Njukini that is adjacent to one of the large-scale farms, most of the current 
residents of this village were born or lived in the staff quarters of the large-scale farms 
but later moved out and carved out farms in the ‘open land’. Some of these residents are 
still considered squatters because their farms lie within the boundaries of the large-scale 
farms but they have not been evicted in more than two decades. These residents claimed 
to be “more secure” now because evictions have ceased since the late 1980s. None of the 
participants interviewed in this village had title for their land.   
 The third group migrated from Ujamaa villages in Tanzania for fear of reprisal in 
the period preceding and after the collapse of the EAC in the 1970s. Majority of these 
settlers were also Akamba. Most of the Akamba who moved from Tanzania felt 
unrepresented politically because they were disconnected from the greater Ukambani 
region of Makueni, Machakos, and Kitui counties in Kenya. Some of those interviewed 
suggested they did not feel adequately of Kamba ethnicity due to their history in 
Tanzania. The last group, which is more recent, is composed of migrants mainly from the 
larger Taita-Taveta, Kajiado, and Ukambani regions. These are mostly ethnic Akamba, 
Taita, Taveta, and Maasai although the Maasai and Taveta have strong historical 
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territorial claims to this area. Table 1 summarizes the settlement history of Njukini. These 
settlement patterns have shaped identities and social relations within this area and have 
often led to forced evictions and conflicts over land since the early 1970s. However, local 
formal and informal institutions exist that help resolve land and water conflicts and 
interviews suggest that many conflicts are indeed resolved locally although tensions 
persist. There are also informal institutions called kamati za ujirani mwema (committees 
for good neighborliness) that mediate cross-border disputes with their neighbors in 
Tanzania. 
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Period Tenure status Land Use/Settlement 
Before 1963 (colonial 
period) 
Open crown land, 
British settler farms, 
Access for Taveta 
beekeeping,  
Access rights for Maasai 
pastoralists (grazing land 
during climatic stresses) 
Seasonal pastoral use, 
Beekeeping for Tavetas, 
Large-scale  
British settler farming 
1963 to early 1970s 
(Period of rapid settlement, 
regional integration, and 
conflict) 
Trust land for the Taveta 
“highly contested”, 
Government protected 
water catchment area, 
Large-scale privately owned 
farms, 
Few untitled Taveta and 
Kamba settlements,  
Access rights for Maasai 
pastoralists 
Water catchment, 
Seasonal pastoral use, 
Large-scale farming, 
Small-scale subsistence 
farming.  
 
Early 1970s to date 
(Rapid settlement and 
population growth, 
evictions, and conflict) 
Large-scale Kenyan-owned 
farms,  
Maasai group ranch,  
Many untitled settlements 
(multiple ethnicities), 
‘Settled squatters’ from 
multiple ethnicities (people 
settled in land that the 
large-scale farms lay 
ownership claims but have 
not been recently evicted)  
Permanent pastoral use,  
Large-scale goat and 
cattle farming, 
Small-scale irrigated 
farming,  
Large-scale Irrigation 
schemes,  
Subsistence non-irrigated 
farming 
 
Table 1: Summary of tenure and settlement history 
Locating contested lands and informal transfers 	  
 As mentioned in an earlier section of this paper, Kenya employs a dual legal and 
institutional system in the administration of land and other property rights. These two 
systems include formal laws and institutions that govern land allocation and tenure on the 
one hand and informal institutions and guidelines based on traditional customary laws 
that may vary from community to community. This dual system has been a key problem 
in the implementation of laws aimed at private ownership because there was little effort 
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to harmonize these two systems after independence and during the development era 
between the 1960s and the late 1980s. Studies have shown that this lack of harmony has 
played a part in cementing inequalities by disenfranchising vulnerable groups (Toulmin, 
2008; Mwangi, 2007). However, more recent studies show that there has been progress in 
trying to address these inequalities and creating a regulatory framework that is more 
inclusive (Santos and Fletschner, 2014; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2008) but concerns 
about inequality in land allocation are still legitimate and widespread. While there are 
advantages and disadvantages of having a dual system or even of each of the two 
systems, some policy trends seem to favor harmonization of the two systems so as to 
promote the security of property rights for individuals and groups while also ensuring 
that traditional forms of customary ownership are encouraged where they are more suited 
to local needs. 
 According to the Land Act of Kenya (2012), there are four forms of tenure 
allowed in Kenya: freehold, leasehold, partial interests such as easements, and customary 
rights where consistent with the constitution of Kenya. Freehold, according to the Land 
Act refers to the right to use and dispose land in perpetuity subject to other laws and 
government regulations. Leasehold refers to “[…] the grant, with or without 
consideration, by the proprietor of land of the right to the exclusive possession of his or 
her land” (Land Act, 2012:11). Partial interests may include but are not limited to non-
possessory interests in another’s land that allow for use to a particular extend while 
customary rights are based on traditional forms of land adjudication and only apply if 
they are consistent with the constitution and the laws of Kenya. There are three important 
issues that arise from the way customary tenure is defined in this act. First, its 
	   59	  
applicability is justified only as far as it is consistent with the constitution which may be 
based on the recognition that it has disenfranchised groups such as women and been used 
by old men to leverage their interests. Secondly, this justification implies an inherent 
preference towards formal tenure, which is consistent with the discourse and policy on 
land allocation in Kenya. Thirdly, there are many known inconsistencies between the 
different types of customary tenure and the constitution and laws of Kenya. This means 
that the act is not meant to address the conflicts and inconsistencies between customary 
tenure and established law but leaves the option to contest customary practices wide open 
for those who would like to challenge them in court. This is problematic because the legal 
process in Kenya is expensive and complicated but even more importantly, many 
disenfranchised individuals and groups may not know that such laws exist that protect 
their rights.  
 The line between customary rights and formal titled tenure is not as distinct as 
policy and law define it. Research on land tenure and rights in Njukini showed that there 
is a third superstructure of land deals and transactions that is unregulated and thriving. 
This is precipitated by the fact that there exists a lot of land held as ‘freehold’ that has 
never been titled. In addition, many holders of freehold rights to parcels of land have not 
updated their title deeds even after the land in question has been subdivided and sold. In 
some cases, land had changed hands many times without title deeds being updated to 
reflect these changes. What existed was written transactions signed by the buyers and 
sellers that were assumed to confer full freehold rights to the buyer. In some cases, the 
land parcels had been surveyed by registered surveyor but in other cases the agreement 
was for a particular size with a caveat when the land is eventually surveyed. Most of the 
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times the caveat was for the buyer to pay for or return for the extra land if it was more 
than agreed or for the seller to provide more land if the parcel was less than agreed. These 
practices are widespread in Kenya because of regulatory problems discussed earlier in 
this paper. I explored land tenure issues in Njukini with a keen interest in how this 
unregulated superstructure may provide loopholes to circumvent protections for 
vulnerable groups within policy and the law. 
 Interestingly, informal land transfers were thriving in Njukini, a place where land 
holding is highly contested and a history of violent evictions exists. Key informant 
interviews suggested that many residents were evicted several times from parts of Njukini 
that were owned by large-scale farmers who had acquired some of the land in Njukini 
after independence in 1963. A key informant from the Irrigation village of Njukini told 
me that many workers from the large-scale farms had moved out of the estate and settled 
in the contested open land from where they were evicted many times. He said, “[…] most 
of us were born in the staff quarters of the large-scale sisal farms but we were not 
allowed to live in the quarters after we were older. So, we moved out and constructed 
houses in the open land.” Some of the land they settled was considered part of the large-
scale estates leading to evictions. However, interviews with locals also suggested that 
evictions had ceased since the 1990s and households were more settled although still 
insecure. 
“People are not being evicted any more but when anybody settles there, they are 
not sure how long they will be there.” Except from a key informant interview with 
a resident of Kijiji A Village in Njukini talking about settlement in contested 
lands close to the large-scale farming estates. 
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 Formal and informal land transfers require a sale. According to key informant 
interviews conducted in Njukini, a sale was legitimate if it was signed by at least three 
members of the seller’s family. This rule is meant to protect members of the family 
whose access rights are not represented in the named owner of the title. These members 
may include the youth, women, or just members of the family who may be opposed to the 
sale. However, several female key informants stated that the requirement for a signature 
from them was more of a formality and that they did not have the power to sale. One 
female key informant said to me: “[…] he will sell the land if he wishes to do so. My 
signature in that piece of paper does not mean that I fully agreed to the sale.” This 
presents a problem for policy in addressing the unequal gender power relations within 
many African institutions such as marriage. The husband is still viewed as the household 
head and wields immense power in terms of control over family resources. Female key 
informants voiced their concerns about land deals being conducted without their consent 
only to be informed when the time came for collecting signatures to authorize the sale. 
 Another important point of contention was in the perception rights over 
matrimonial property. The threat of gender-based dispossession was a common theme for 
female-headed households in cases where the husband was deceased. Several key 
informants reported that matrimonial land dispossession was common in the area when 
the husband died before the male children were of age to claim the land or resist attempts 
from their uncles and other relatives. A female key informant told me that she had 
resisted several attempts to forcefully remove her from her matrimonial property by her 
husband’s brothers after the death of her husband. However, she also informed me that 
the local authorities, the chief and sub-chief, had resolved the issues after she reported 
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being harassed. This is not uncommon in Kenya and although laws and policies exist to 
protect matrimonial property, many victim for whom the law is meant are either unaware 
of it, scared of the consequences of taking on the traditional authority, or are just unaware 
of the existence of such provisions. In addition, the legal process in Kenya is expensive 
and can be emotionally taxing in cases involving close relations.       
 Njukini is also site of a clash of interests for different communities living there. 
The Maasai claim, the Taveta claim, and the claims made by those communities that 
eventually settled there can be seen as different perceptions of what the landscape was 
and should be for the different communities. However, these claims are dynamic and 
constantly evolving with new realities that face the local population. For example, only 
forty-five percent of respondents surveyed were born in Njukini and the average 
landholding was only two acres as shown in table two and three. Table four shows land 
acquisition methods for the local households surveyed. However all the households 
surveyed had no titles for their land but claimed freehold rights. A major source of 
conflict therefore arises from the fact that despite the area having a relatively high 
population density, some communities (Maasai and Taveta) claim traditional territorial 
rights to land that has already changed hands many times and often among members of 
other communities. These land transactions are largely informal and unregulated and 
therefore land ownership in this area cannot be classified as purely fitting any of the four 
forms of land tenure as per the Land Act of 2012. The challenge therefore is determining 
what a fair land tenure regime would be for an area such as this? This is not just a 
problem in Njukini but in many other areas where historically contested land already 
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held, as freehold is not titled. This is especially rampant in the coastal and rift valley 
regions but is also common in other parts of the country especially around wetlands. 
 
Size of Primary plot Njukini  
None (Landless) 2.5% 
Between 1 and 3 acres 62.5% 
Between 3 and 5 acres 27.5% 
Less than 1 acre 7.5% 
More than 5 acres 0 
Table 3: Landholding in Njukini 
Land Acquisition Method Njukini 
Bought 25% 
Government Allocation 30% 
Inheritance 32.5% 
Inheritance-squatter 10% 
Lease 2.5% 
Table 4: Land acquisition method in Njukini 
The lack of title deeds for the people of Njukini many years after they have settled 
a piece of land raises many questions about the politics of the future of the area. The 
Taveta ethnic community through the Taveta county council went to court in the 1980s to 
claim that the land in Njukini was trust land held in trust by the Taveta County council 
for the Taveta ethnic group. However, according to several leaders and other respondents, 
this case is still pending in court for “political reasons”. Key informant interviews 
suggested the existence of an expectation by the Taveta ethnic group that only Tavetas 
should hold parliamentary seats although there was evidence of non-Tavetas winning the 
seat before. This seems to be a strategic expectation by the Tavetas in recognition of their 
territorial claim and their minority status. It is difficult to ascertain how long this 
arrangement will last. Several respondents claimed that tensions run high during election 
Was the household head born in this 
village 
Njukini  
Yes 55% 
No 45% 
Table 2: Settlement history in Njukini 
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years when other communities field candidates and this sometimes results to ethnic 
clashes although most of the times tensions are resolved peacefully. The following quote 
from interviews illustrates the nature of tensions in Njukini:  
“During the election period, we usually have problems here. The Taveta ethnic 
group has claimed that if people want the farms, they can take them but they 
should keep away from politics. The political positions in this area belong to the 
Taveta people. If the other communities stay away from politics, the Tavetas have 
no problem with the land.” Mzee Mwasi (not his real name), an ethnic Taita. 
 
The Maasai, on the other hand, were able in the late 1980s to secure a group ranch 
in the area in a process that locals defined as highly politicized. Locals claimed that the 
small group ranch allocated to the Maasai was meant to appease them and satisfy their 
claim to the land in the area. Several respondents pointed out that the establishment of the 
group ranch was only possible because of the influence of senior Maasai leaders in the 
then KANU government at the time headed by president Moi. They further claimed that 
the allocation was problematic especially because that was the only group-ranch to be 
established in the then Coast Province although the group ranch is an extension of larger 
group ranches in the neighboring Kajiado County. However, all the Maasai respondents 
interviewed claimed that the land allocated was too small to satisfy their claim to the 
grazing area that they had lost to other communities that had settled there. These 
conflicting claims have led to tensions among the different groups in Njukini but rarely 
turn into violence, which may be attributed to the local institutional setup. The most 
serious conflicts involving the Maasai pastoralists and the local farmers arise during 
droughts when alternative seasonal livestock watering areas have dried up as the Maasai 
were said to drive their cattle through the irrigated farms into the main permanent river 
causing crop destruction. 
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 Njukini is an extremely complicated case of tenure security but it is a good 
illustration of the chaos that surrounds the fairness of land allocation and transfer for 
lands that are held as freehold but are not formally titled. More importantly, it illustrates 
the complexity of assuring rights to vulnerable groups whose rights of access may be 
taken away during informal transfers since the lack of title means that these lands only 
partially fit into the legal definition of freehold tenure. Although the government and 
other policy makers may recognize these lands as freehold and legitimately privately 
owned, there exist no policy framework in Kenya to transfer land that is not titled unless 
it is held under customary ownership. Even in areas where settlement and land tenure is 
not complicated, many individuals have not kept their transfer records up-to-date due to 
high registration costs, and long and complex government bureaucracies (see Peters, 
2009; Joireman, 2008). This means that if these lands are eventually titled, the 
verification of consent by those who claim rights may only occur, if at all, on the last 
transaction. Consequently, that last transaction cements and legitimizes all the previous 
transfers, however unequal they may have been. Kenyan political leaders are also known 
to use the allocation of titles as a campaign tool around election time without regard to 
how such actions may legitimate and cement past disenfranchisement.  
Conclusion 	  
 Many countries in Africa have been undergoing land tenure reform since 
independence in the 1960s. Some countries like Kenya have aggressively pushed for 
tenure regimes that are guided by private property rights law and a movement towards 
formal tenure relations since independence. Part of this push was to aid in capital 
formation and was highly supported by development agencies in the last quarter of the 
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twentieth century. As the spread of capitalist property relations continues in Africa, 
studies have shown a recent trend towards the formalization of land tenure. Recent 
research has tended to focus not on abolishing customary laws on land allocation and 
access in light of a movement to formal tenure but more on harmonizing both regimes 
and encouraging customary tenure where it is suitable to local needs. A substantial 
amount of research has also been done on land conflict and especially in the advent of 
climate change and an increasing population that coupled with other politico-economic 
stressors may undermine the ability of livelihoods that are primarily reliant on natural 
capital. This paper contributes to the growing discourse on land tenure in Africa and 
especially in informing a policy framework that does not only provide a protection for 
disenfranchised groups but also one that provides civic education opportunities to inform 
these groups about the said protections. In this paper, I explored the ways in which 
different groups may be disenfranchised even with the existence of laws and policies 
meant to protect them. I find that informal land transfers offer a mechanism for 
landowners to circumvent the often expensive and bureaucratic formal land transfer 
system. However, in so doing, informal land transfers also provide avenues for 
landowners to avoid or even disregard the protections offered to groups that may possess 
access rights to the land being transferred. More research therefore needs to be done on 
these transfers that are not necessarily customary but are not officially formal because 
they do not involve the issuance of title to guide policy and prevent conflict. In addition, 
a review of land formalization policies is necessary for Kenya in order to simplify the 
process and make it affordable so as to guard against the entrenchment of these informal 
transfers. 
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CHAPTER 4: CROSS-BORDER ALTITUDINAL 
GRADIENTS: DIVERSITY AND CHANGE AMIDST 
MULTIPLE STRESSORS 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the patterns of livelihood diversification and change along 
the altitudinal gradient of Mt Kilimanjaro. The study utilizes four case studies along the 
altitudinal gradient to show the diversity of land use and livelihood types between the 
ecological zones and how social relations among these zones are responsive to both 
ecological and socioeconomic changes. The study finds evidence of intensification of 
interdependence and increased livelihood diversification. These changes vary across the 
gradient but are structured to benefit and exploit the ecological diversity of the gradient.      
 
Keywords: Livelihoods, social relations, climate change, gradients, conflict, Kilimanjaro 
Solomon, M. Cross-border altitudinal gradients: Diversity and change amidst multiple 
stressors. (Intended to be published in Journal of Rural Studies). 
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Introduction 	  
In Africa, changing social and material relations have resulted in the 
transformation of both livelihood systems and the institutions that govern local resource 
allocation and access mechanisms (Smucker et al. 2015; Wangui et al. 2012; Toulmin, 
2008; Campbell, 1999). Research indicates that this transformation is largely driven by 
broader changes in socioeconomic relations as well as biophysical factors (IPCC, 2014). 
Many climate vulnerability studies have also emphasized that the effects of increased 
vulnerability due to climate shocks and stresses will be differentiated both 
socioeconomically and geographically (Smucker et al. 2015; Wangui et al. 2012; 
Scheffran et al. 2012b; Barnett and Adger, 2007). In addition, the effects of climate 
change will be more devastating in poor countries and mostly among those livelihoods 
that are dependent primarily on natural capital (Scheffran et al. 2012a; Shongwe et al. 
2011; Fussel, 2011; Samson et al. 2011; Barnett and Adger, 2007). Consequently, there 
will be differential effects depending on the sensitivity of livelihoods to climate change 
and this will vary in temporal and spatial terms. According to the IPCC (2014), the 
effects of climate shocks are likely to increase global and country-scale inequality both 
for current and future generations especially in developing countries. Consequently, these 
changes are likely to alter the social and material relations that exist between and within 
affected livelihood groups and potentially strengthen or weaken the adaptive capacity of 
these livelihood systems. 
However, biophysical changes are only a part of the factors that constitute the 
causal structure of vulnerability and the material conditions of poor rural households. In 
Africa, global and national economic policies have affected local resource access patterns 
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through privatization, government expropriation, and varying degrees of access to non-
agrarian employment among other factors (Wangui et al. 2012; Smucker and Wisner, 
2008). Availability of non-farm employment opportunities has resulted in mixed 
outcomes for agriculture-based livelihoods. For example, O’Brien and Leichenko (2003) 
found that trade liberalization has benefited many rural farmers through access to local 
and global markets and made it easier to access alternative sources of income in Southern 
Africa. However, it had also resulted in increased vulnerability for some due to local and 
global fluctuation of crop prices, competition with cheaper imports, and other problems 
associated with a neoliberal agricultural sector. This changing vulnerability status has led 
to a reorganization of rural social relations of production and created new spatial 
interdependences among livelihood groups. 
While a lot of research has been done on the causal structure of vulnerability and 
broader scale mechanisms of enhancing coping and adaptive capacity for climate 
impacts, little has been done on the social benefit of material relations among different 
livelihood groups living within relatively small but diverse regions. Local scale relations 
of cooperation and other forms of inter-group contact may confer mutual benefits and 
strengthen the coping and adaptive capacity of different socioeconomic groups. The 
material realities of different livelihood systems change rapidly in a relatively small area 
as you move along a mountain gradient in many parts of Africa. This livelihood diversity 
within a small area may strengthen livelihoods through mutual interdependence networks 
and trade.      
Land use and livelihood systems vary across the landscape in Africa depending on 
the availability of resources and social relations of production and conflict. Each of these 
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land use and livelihood systems are structured to exploit the ecological niches available at 
their ecological zone. Majule et al. (2009) have explored the concept of the ecological 
gradient as a framework for understanding the distribution and the relations that exist 
among livelihood groups living in different ecological zones in Africa. They argue that 
land use and livelihood systems vary spatially in line with ecological conditions and these 
changing practices may be represented as ecological gradients. These gradients may be 
vertical as in the slopes of mountains or horizontal as in across ecological zones within a 
vast area. Vertical gradients may also be referred to as altitudinal gradients because they 
exist on mountain slopes with changing temperature and rainfall conditions as you move 
from the warmer and drier lowlands to the colder and wetter higher elevations on the 
mountain. Altitudinal gradients form largely because of elevation change and orographic 
effects. These altitudinal gradients are characterized by differing and sometimes steep 
changes in physical and biotic composition giving rise to a system of both distinct and 
transitional ecological zones that provide varying resources exploited by individuals and 
groups living there for their livelihood needs  (Abbott and Brennan, 2014). 
In tropical Africa, these ecological changes within the altitudinal gradient also 
represent changes in livelihood systems as inhabitants of different ecological zones 
organize themselves and structure their livelihoods around available resources within that 
zone. This gives rise to a livelihood zonation from the lowland warm and dry savannas 
through the relatively cool and wet mid-elevations to the cold and wet high altitudes. 
However, social and economic relations also exist among the different livelihood groups 
that live within the same altitudinal gradient. These relations are likely to be more intense 
because altitudinal gradients are usually more spatially condensed compared to horizontal 
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ecological gradients (Majule et al. 2009; Smucker and Wisner, 2008). Livelihood systems 
in altitudinal gradients organize themselves to benefit or protect themselves from 
surrounding ecological zones thereby forming a web of interdependence and/or conflict 
across the different ecological zones (Wangui et al. 2012; Smucker et al. 2015). Social 
relations of exchange, understanding, and conflict thus exist among varying ecological 
zones with some zones commanding more resources and economic advantage over 
others. In their study of land use change along the altitudinal gradient in Mt Kilimanjaro, 
Majule et al. (2009) claim to have found “[…] strong evidence that the areas of higher 
economic potential remain advantaged compared to areas lower on the gradient.”     
“[…] Detailed case studies on the gradients of the slopes of Mt Kilimanjaro, 
Kenya show how land-use change is responsive to the dynamics of both local and 
external driving forces.” (Majule et al. 2009) 
 
The assertion by Majule et al. (2009) that land use change is responsive to local 
and broader-scale sociopolitical factors is an important consideration in analyzing social 
and economic relations within altitudinal gradients. This is because socioeconomic 
relations between individuals and groups are also relations of power. Power is exercised 
in the negotiations or conflicts over access and control of resources within the gradient 
and this may create winners and losers. Power relations are also shaped by sociopolitical 
and economic as well as biophysical changes at different temporal and spatial scales. 
Consequently, the socioeconomic dominance of any of the livelihood systems within an 
altitudinal gradient is rarely, if ever, permanent. Broader scale sociopolitical changes may 
affect the importance of certain livelihood systems within the different ecological zones 
and alter the perceived economic benefits of certain commodities thus shifting power and 
material relations across the gradient. For example, studies have shown that lowland 
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pastoralists controlled greater power than their highland counterparts during the pre-
colonial times largely because of access to vast grazing and watering areas and the 
general perception that pastoralism was more economically productive than farming 
(Majule et al. 2009; Mworia and Kinyamario, 2008; Campbell, 1999; Tiffen and 
Mortimore, 2008; Ellis and Swift, 1988). However, pastoral dominance greatly declined 
in the post-colonial period due to sociopolitical and biophysical changes including: 
government policies in favor of sedentary agriculture, changes in land availability and 
access for pastoralists, the perception of pastoralism as anti-modern, and increased 
climate variability (Eriksen and Lind, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Homewood et al. 2001). More 
recently, fluctuations in local and global prices of important crops grown higher in the 
gradient, reducing plot sizes due to population pressure coupled with a changing climate 
have put pressure on production systems in the high elevation areas of the altitudinal 
gradient. This may suggest an increasing importance of areas lower in the gradient that 
have access to irrigation water since they have the ability to produce year round and also 
tend to have relatively larger per capita land holding.   
Nevertheless, the transformation of social relations within livelihood systems in 
ecological gradients does not only happen in the extremities rather they are becoming 
increasingly common even within less distinct livelihood systems. For instance, as 
pastoralism continues to decline due to changing tenure regimes and enclosure in the 
Kilimanjaro region of East Africa, formerly grazing lands have been turned into zones of 
mixed farming or irrigated agriculture (Homewood et al. 2009; Mwangi, 2007; 
Woodhouse et al. 2000; Campbell, 1999). This has transformed the altitudinal gradient 
into rapidly changing ecological zones and altered interdependence patterns. In some 
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cases, some formerly distinct ecological zones have merged over time or much less 
differences exist between livelihoods in formerly distinct areas. This has also led to the 
existence of diverse livelihood systems within small areas, which may imply an 
intensification of livelihood interdependence across the gradient.  
Recent studies indicate that climate variability in this region will continue to 
affect the social and material relations of different livelihood groups within altitudinal 
gradients as they struggle to cope and adapt to changing resource availability and access 
patterns (Smucker et al. 2015; Wangui et al. 2012; Eriksen and Lind, 2009). Declining 
rainfall averages and increasing variability has already disrupted agricultural livelihoods 
and caused differing levels of livelihood transformation in the altitudinal gradient in Mt 
Kilimanjaro (Wangui et al. 2012; Majule et al. 2009). Increasing population density has 
put pressure on agricultural production as plot sizes decrease across the gradient. In 
addition, increased connectedness in the broader economy has availed new opportunities 
for livelihood diversification and led to increasing prominence of non-farm livelihood 
options such as casual labor and dependence on remittances. This suggests that old forms 
of interdependence across the gradient may be changing or even intensifying as new 
forms of interdependence or take shape. For instance, Wangui et al. (2012), found that 
major changes have already occurred among the waPare of the Usambara Mountains of 
Northern Tanzania with up to threefold change in staple food being reported in the last 
fifty years. 
An institutional framework is critical in managing social relations among 
interdependent groups. Institutions, formal and informal, exist to facilitate the proper 
management of resources and mitigate conflicts emerging from differing interests among 
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individuals and groups. The existing institutions must also be properly constituted and the 
people they govern have to perceive them as capable of representing the interests they 
serve in a fair manner. Smucker et al. (2015:42) found that within the Kilimanjaro region 
of Tanzania, institutions exist in the local level to govern land use whereby land uses are 
formally zoned into categories such as agriculture, grazing land, and commercial 
settlement among other uses. They argue that the existence of these institutions has the 
“[…] potential to rework access to natural resources that influence patterns of climate-
related risk.” However, in the neighboring Kenya, such institutions do not exist at a local 
level and the land that had been originally classified as pastoral land for herding groups 
has already been sub-divided into group ranches most of which have in turn been divided 
and converted into private ownership (Mwangi, 2007). Therefore, although the border 
communities of the Kilimanjaro region in both Kenya and Tanzania are highly 
interdependent, the formal institutional structure is highly complicated because of the 
jurisdictional issues and differences presented by the existence of a national boundary. In 
addition, the prevailing relations between the two countries may sometimes influence 
cross-border relations, for better or for worse. 
This paper examines how biophysical and sociopolitical factors have influenced 
social and economic relations among the different socioeconomic and cultural groups 
living along the Northeastern side of the Mt Kilimanjaro gradient. This is particularly 
interesting because of the existence of a national boundary within the altitudinal gradient, 
which presents an interesting dynamic in the relations between local groups and the 
institutions that govern social relations in these areas. I approach the study from the 
perceptions of communities living on the Kenyan side of the border in the lowland 
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gradients but also use responses from the lowland, middle, and higher gradients on the 
Tanzanian side of the border to examine the nature and level of interdependence and its 
driving forces. This study is guided by two main questions: 1) what are the 
interdependence patterns that exist along the altitudinal gradient of Mt Kilimanjaro in 
Kenya and Tanzania and how have they changed over time? 2) How have institutions 
adjusted to changing social relations along the altitudinal gradient and across the political 
boundary?  
This study finds that there is increased diversification and intensification of 
interdependence among the livelihood groups living along the Kilimanjaro gradient to 
boost adaptive capacity. Population pressure, decreasing farm sizes, and soil depletion 
coupled with broader economic changes are driving high elevation farmers into the 
lowlands in search of casual labor and alternative farming land. In addition, there is an 
increase in the dependence on remittances and other non-farm sources of income from 
outside of the region, which may signal an increase in vulnerability among local 
livelihoods. However this increased dependence on off-farm sources of income from 
outside the region may also signal a greater integration into the broader economy. I also 
find that local informal institutions worked better in the resolution of cross-border 
conflicts and in facilitating cross-border economic relations than formal institutions. In 
the next section I explain the data and methods used in this study and then define the 
important characteristics of the region under investigation. I then present the study results 
and conclude with an explanation of key findings.      
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Data and Methods 	  
This study employs both qualitative and quantitative data and methods. A large 
part of the data for this analysis was collected as part of the Local Knowledge and 
Climate Change Adaptation Project (LKCCAP), which was implemented in the Pare-
Kilimanjaro region of East Africa in the period between 2009 and 2015. This was a 
National Science Foundation (NSF) funded research involving researchers from Ohio 
University, Sokoine University of Agriculture in Tanzania, and Michigan State 
University.  Qualitative key informant interviews and household surveys were conducted 
on low, middle, and high altitudinal gradients on people’s experiences and perceptions of 
change in climate variability and broader socioeconomic trends. Qualitative key 
informant interviews and quantitative surveys were conducted in four locations on the Mt 
Kilimanjaro gradient namely: the lowland area of Njukini in Kenya, the middle gradient 
area of Shimbi Mashariki in Tanzania, and the higher elevation gradients of Ibukoni and 
Mokala also in Tanzania. A total of thirty-eight key informant interviews were conducted 
in the four research locations involving community leaders, elders, government officials, 
and non-governmental organizations (NGO) personnel working in the area on their 
perceptions of socioeconomic and ecological change in the area. Qualitative key 
informant interviews were then coded into descriptive and analytic codes to establish 
themes on the web of relations and interests that exists between individuals and groups 
along the altitudinal gradient. A total of one hundred and sixty surveys, forty in each of 
the four villages, were relied upon for the purposes of this paper. The surveys were 
entered into a spreadsheet and descriptive statistics were uses to further explain patterns 
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in the themes generated from the qualitative thematic analysis.  Survey data was also 
used to illustrate the differences in livelihood organization along the gradient. 
To augment data collected in the field and answer important questions on the 
nature of change in climate variables, a climatological analysis was done for three 
altitudinal gradients areas using data from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU TS 3.1; 
Mitchell et al., 2004) for the period between 1980 and 2009. This was done to provide 
evidence on the nature of change or variability in precipitation patterns, which has a large 
bearing on agricultural production in these areas. The mean precipitation (mm/day) and 
daily mean, maximum, and minimum temperatures (degree C) derived from the CRU 
datasets were used to calculate the time series of monthly and seasonal mean 
precipitation (Lee et al. 2009). The CRU climate variables are high-resolution gridded 
data obtained from meteorological stations over the global land surface. Spatial 
resolutions (longitude by latitude) of the CRU data are 0.5° by 0.5° and the data are 
available from 1901 to 2009. The CRU data was obtained from the data center for the 
atmospheric sciences at the British Atmospheric Data Center (BADC) in the Natural 
Environment Research Council (NERC). The regional climate variables for Taita-Taveta 
in the Kenyan side and the greater lower Rombo region of Tanzania were extracted from 
the high-resolution precipitation and temperature data using existing CRU grid points 
from which CRU aggregates rainfall data for the area (Shongwe et al. 2011; Lee et al. 
2009) over a longitude and latitude domain including the study sites (Taita plains 38.25 
E, 3.25 S; Njukini, 37.75 E, 3.25 S; and Kilimanjaro, 37.25 E, 3.25 S). Note that the area 
noted as Njukini in the seasonal rainfall variation analysis is a point close to the Kenya 
Tanzania border that is relatively higher than the villages from where the lowland surveys 
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and qualitative interviews were conducted. This data was also compared with station data 
from the region for accuracy assessment. A correlation comparison between thirty year 
(1980-2009) March-May (MAM) rain gauge data from the nearest station in Voi, which 
is lower in elevation (577 m.a.s.l) and drier, was compared to CRU values for Taita and 
were found to have a significant positive correlation with a Pearson’s R of 0.9. Figure 2 
shows how the data varied between the two datasets. The temporal and spatial 
climatological analysis was performed in the Grid Analysis and Display System 
(GrADS), which is a programmable interface that allows for visualization and statistical 
analysis of climatological data (Doty, 1995). 
 
	  
Figure 2: Annual March-May precipitation totals (Station and CRU data comparison), 
1980-2009 	  
Changing Ecological and Socioeconomic Systems along the Kilimanjaro 
Gradient 	  
The ecological gradients along the Mt Kilimanjaro altitudinal gradient have 
unique resources that change as you move from the lowlands to the higher altitude zones. 
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These agro-ecological zones provide various opportunities for the different livelihood 
groups found in this area and that influences the land use types found along the gradient. 
This study covers three agro-ecological zones: the lowland zones (<1000 m.a.s.l.) of 
extensive pastoralist, mixed farming, and irrigated agriculture; the midland belt (1000 - 
1200 m.a.l.s.) which is characterized by intensive crop farming, especially maize and 
beans; and the highlands (1200 - 2000 m.a.l.s.) which is the coffee-banana growing belt 
(Majule et al. 2009; Soini, 2005). The rest of the ecological zones in the higher elevations 
of the mountain include: the Montane forest and the Alpine desert at the summit (Majule 
et al. 2009; Mbonile et al. 2003). However, it must be noted that these ecological zones 
are not as distinct as presented because there are transitional zones between each of the 
ecological zones that may have characteristics similar to each zone on both sides of the 
elevation gradient. Also similar crops such as maize and beans are grown across the 
gradient although the varieties may vary with ecological characteristics and resources. 
Figure 3 shows the locations of study sites along the Kilimanjaro gradient. 
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Figure 3: Study area - From the lowlands of Njukini to the high elevation Mokala 
 Two rainy seasons and two dry seasons associated with the migration of the 
Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) characterize the climate of the Kilimanjaro 
region. The rainy seasons include the long rains (March - May) known as Masika in 
KiSwahili and the short rains (October - December) known as Vuli in KiSwahili. After 
each rainy season is a dry season known as Kiangazi in KiSwahili. The intensity of the 
rainy and dry seasons varies greatly in both temporal and spatial terms along the gradient. 
According to Soini (2005), annual average rainfall varies between 200 mm in the 
lowlands to 2000 mm in the coffee-banana belt suggesting a great difference between 
average annual rainfall in the lowland and the annual averages for the higher gradients. It 
was therefore necessary to conduct a precipitation analysis to illustrate the seasonal 
precipitation trends for the region. This was particularly important for the lowlands 
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because they are more sensitive to rainfall variation because their seasonal averages are 
relatively low. For example, a majority of respondents in the lowlands observed that the 
long rains or Masika (March - May) had become almost totally unreliable making it 
difficult for farmers, as they sometimes had to go for nine months of the year without 
harvest. In some cases, the duration between rainy days was so variable for this region 
that even when there was a relatively regular amount of rainfall the crops would not 
withstand the variability. This quote from a local elder from Njukini sums up the 
frustration of local farmers in the lowlands: 
“[...] The long rains are not reliable. Sometimes it rains heavily for just two weeks 
and then when you plant and expect it to rain again the rain does not come back 
so the plants just wither and dry in the farms. By the time the rain comes back the 
crops are only good for feeding livestock.”  
 
An analysis of thirty-year annual mean precipitation shows great variability in 
precipitation patterns in the entire region. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate rainfall variability for 
three adjacent grid points derived from CRU precipitation. The selected grid points range 
from an elevation of 846 m.a.s.l in the Taita region to 1267 m.a.s.l in the slopes of Mt 
Kilimanjaro in Tanzania and stretch a ground distance of 111.15 km. March to May 
(MAM) precipitation totals for both Njukini and Taveta, which are lowland regions, seem 
to have relatively lower peaks for the last twenty years compared to the previous decade. 
For the higher elevation Kilimanjaro grid point, the totals are higher than the lowland 
regions with an unusual high of 1657 during the El Niño period of 1997/1998. All three 
locations show evidence of high variability for the MAM season with the period between 
the years 1990 to 2000 being the most variable. The period between 2000 and 2009 has 
relatively lower MAM totals compared to the previous two decades. Precipitation totals 
for the October to December (OND) season are relatively lower than the MAM season. 
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The OND season also has more year-to-year variability especially for the period between 
the years 1980 to 2000 after which we see less variability from year to year but also less 
total annual precipitation for the season. Overall, the three regions registered less 
precipitation totals for both seasons in the 2000-2009 decade than in the previous two 
decades. This information is consistent with responses from key informant interviews that 
suggested precipitation for MAM season is unreliable because of its variability within the 
season (onset, end, and between rainfall events) rather than its totals. The overall 
reduction in precipitation totals in the last decade of the study period could spell an 
increasing vulnerability to agricultural livelihoods in this region.       
 
	  
Figure 4: CRU Annual March-May precipitation totals, 1980-2009 
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Figure 5: CRU Annual October-December precipitation totals, 1980-2009 
This variability is also reflected in the qualitative responses with respondents in 
the lowlands complaining of inadequate rainfall, decreases in water availability as 
formerly permanent streams turned seasonal, late and early onset of precipitation as well 
as early end. This anecdotal evidence shows that annual average rainfall numbers may be 
important in informing us about year-to-year variations but are deficient in an analysis of 
the impact of variability on farming systems. In addition, livelihood systems vary greatly 
in the lowlands, as there are farmers with access to irrigation water and therefore who can 
produce all year. Those farmers without irrigation water practice mixed farming or 
pastoralism and they generally reported larger farms than those groups in the high 
elevations or those in lowlands with access to water for irrigation. Some mixed farmers in 
the dry lowlands without access to water also lease out their land to pastoralists during 
the dry seasons for grazing. Livelihoods within the Kilimanjaro gradient are thus 
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structured to benefit in some way from each other although these benefits vary in time 
and space.  
Respondents in the lowlands were also more sensitive and aware of the discourse 
on climate variability and change with many of them saying they have observed changes 
and variations in climate patterns over the last thirty years. This suggests that climate 
variability and change are a priority issue in the lowlands as many respondents said they 
were worried about how sufficient rainfall would affect crop yields and more generally 
their livelihoods. In the highlands, respondents were concerned about cropland 
productivity, increased costs, crop and livestock diseases, and decreasing farm sizes. 
Respondents in these zones also reported increased incidence of malaria but did not 
directly associate it with climate. Whereas majority of the key informants interviewed in 
the highland zone said that they had observed changes in climate patterns in the last ten to 
fifteen years a claim which is evident from the precipitation graphs, majority of those 
interviewed in the lowlands said that changes had been observed since the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. However, some of the highland farmers reported variable crop yields 
because of unpredictable rainfall patterns in their lowland farms that had no access to 
irrigation water.  
Another major change reported was the change in crops produced and their uses. 
In the lowlands, there was increased intensification of irrigated agriculture. Because of 
the proximity to Mt Kilimanjaro, the water table for the lowlands is not very low and 
several rivers and springs flow within these lowland areas. There are also many boreholes 
within homesteads producing water for both domestic and irrigation uses. However, 
according to key informant interviews in Njukini, extensive irrigated agriculture only 
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started in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to population pressure and decreasing 
farmland sizes. Before then, irrigated agriculture was practiced mainly in the areas close 
to the main rivers and many farmers produced for subsistence. During the research in 
Njukini, I observed that almost all households visited with access to water for irrigation 
practiced some level of irrigated agriculture. These varied from small backyard vegetable 
gardens to intensive irrigated farms which grew cucumbers, beans, pepper, tomatoes, and 
other horticultural crops for export to Mombasa, Nairobi, and overseas. Millet, sorghum, 
cotton, and other drought resistant crops were also common in the lowland areas without 
access to irrigation water. 
The midlands and the highlands have also undergone substantial changes in terms 
of crop types and uses. In the midlands, coffee and banana production had almost ceased 
and farmers reported major decreases in maize and bean crop productivity. A key 
informant in Mokala reported that within the past twenty to thirty years coffee 
productivity had fallen from about 240 Kg to between 30Kg and 50Kg in his farm. He 
also reported the drying of coffee and banana trees in the area. However, these changes 
were attributed to several factors including drought, crop pests and diseases, decreasing 
farmlands, and soil nutrient depletion. In the highlands, decreases in coffee and banana 
production were reported with all key informants reporting at least a reduction in coffee 
and banana yields. There was also a decrease in the number of livestock kept. Like in the 
midlands, these decreases were attributed to several factors including ageing of coffee 
and banana trees, soil nutrient depletion, and high population density leading to a 
decrease in farming land. A key informant from Mokala reported an increased use of 
bananas as a source of food rather than as a key ingredient for making alcohol.      
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Livelihood Interdependence Patterns    	  
 Livelihood interdependence in the Kilimanjaro gradient is not just a way of 
coping with extreme variation in climate patterns but it also offers avenues for 
strengthening livelihoods and adjusting to broader changes in the political economy. This 
is evidenced by the changes in settlement and social relations of production that occurred 
through time in this region. While most of the highland and midland gradients have long 
histories of settlement and land tenure the lowlands were mostly permanently settled in 
the last quarter of the 21st century. For example, 96% and 91% of survey respondents in 
the highland and midland gradients of Mokala and Ibuloni respectively reported to having 
born in that village compared to 70% and 45% in the lower gradients of Shimbi 
Mashariki and Njukini respectively as shown in figure 6. Key informant interviews also 
showed that the lowland gradient of Njukini was mostly settled in the 1970s although it 
provided an important grazing land for Maasai pastoralists from neighboring Kajiado and 
Loitoktok and also beekeeping space for the Taveta before the mass settlements of the 
1970s and 1980s. These changes in settlement patterns with time point towards an 
increasing importance of lowland areas for livelihoods living there and also 
diversification options for those living higher in the gradient. 
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Figure 6: Percent of residents born in village of residence 
 Land holding is also an important indicator of livelihood interdependence in the 
Kilimanjaro gradient. In the higher gradients of Mokala and Ibukoni, 60% and 47% 
respectively reported a household landholding of less than one acre with about 4.4% of 
household reporting no land at all in both places. In a place where production systems are 
centered on the land resource, further land fragmentation can only lower the productivity 
of local agricultural systems exerting even more pressure to a system that is already under 
threat. This situation raises serious questions about the future of these highland 
livelihoods and whether it is possible to reverse deteriorating patterns of productivity 
reported by key informants. In the lower gradients, landholding was much higher with 
62.5% of respondents in Njukini reporting between one and three acres while in Shimbi 
Mashariki 37% reported a landholding of between one and three acres. However, 20% of 
the highland gradient respondents of Mokala reported to have cultivated an alternative 
farm in the lowlands in the last year while 84.45% of respondents in Ibukoni reported to 
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have cultivated a lowland plot in the previous year. This high number of alternative plots 
for respondents in Ibukoni may be attributed to the location of Ibukoni as a transitional 
zone between the lowlands and highland gradients. Figure 7 and 8 summarize 
landholding patterns in the study sites. Access to alternative land in the lowlands for 
highland households was through various methods ranging from private ownership to 
seasonal, yearly, and several year leases. The size of household land in the highland 
regions of Mokala suggests that meaningful non-subsistence production has already 
collapsed. What exists is production of a variety of both cash crops and food crops at a 
very small scale and with increasing population; these production systems are also under 
threat. With lowland regions helping absorb the pressures associated with dwindling land 
and other resources in the highlands, one wonders how long this can continue until it 
reaches a breaking point. 
	  
Figure 7: Size of primary household plot in acres 
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Figure 7: Size of primary household plot in acres 
	  
Figure 8: Number of lowland plots cultivated in the last year  
 Many households across the altitudinal gradient reported farming as their primary 
source of livelihood although many other households reported a mix of farming and other 
activities such as casual labor and trade. These responses also varied with the altitudinal 
gradient. For example, figure 9 shows that 20% and 31.12% of respondents in the higher 
gradients of Mokala and Ibukoni respectively reported a diversified livelihood that 
included farming, labor, and trade as the primary occupation of the household head while 
only 11.63% and 12.5% of respondents in the lowland gradients of Shimbi Mashariki and 
Njukini respectively reported similar livelihood practices. Key informant interviews 
echoed these responses. For instance, several key informants from Njukini’s irrigated 
areas reported large numbers of people seeking casual labor from the higher elevation 
areas across the border. Several respondents from the non-irrigated areas within Njukini 
also complained that this movement of people from across the border was driving daily 
casual wages down in the irrigated areas. An interesting observation from responses 
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among the lowland farmers within the irrigated areas of Njukini on the Kenyan side of 
the border was that extensive irrigation in the area did not start until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. One of the key informants asserted, “[…] I remember, it was just the other 
day when the people here started irrigated farming. We did all the work and did not know 
where to sell our produce. Now there are so many people from here and across the border 
(in Tanzania) looking for work.” 
	  
Figure 9: Primary occupation of household head 
Access to water for irrigation, domestic use, and for livestock in the lowlands is 
critical in maintaining livelihoods. The main water access points consist of rivers, 
boreholes, shallow wells, and springs. The farmers in these regions have the advantage of 
practicing irrigated agriculture all year round producing horticultural crops for both the 
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chilies, brenjols, capsicum, green beans, maize, beans, potatoes, and green grams. 
However, too much consumption of the water resource during droughts in the irrigated 
areas results to a significant reduction in water in other areas in the lowlands. For 
example, key informant interviews suggested that continued exploitation of streams 
supplying the Tsavo River by farmers upstream, in the villages of Sir Ramson and Town 
in Njukini, leads to drying up of the streams relied upon by herders who live lower in the 
gradient, around Lumi. This creates conflicts between farmers and herders because small 
farms, which are not fenced as farmers try to utilize all the available space for farming, 
surround the springs in the irrigated areas. Key informant interviews reported that herders 
are known to drive their cattle through the irrigated farms into the watering areas causing 
violent clashes with the farm owners. 
These interdependence patterns raise important questions about livelihood 
vulnerability, climate change adaptation, and material change for livelihoods living along 
the Kilimanjaro gradient. Over time the relations between lowland farmers and their 
highland counterparts have changed with those with access to irrigated water becoming 
more and more important in not just providing casual labor but producing cheaper food 
around the year for locals on both side of the border. However, this intensive irrigated 
farming only started in the late 1980s and could be seen as an adaptive response to the 
impacts of climate variability and change in the lowlands. Irrigated agriculture is also 
facing similar challenges to those faced by highland farmers. Access to land in the 
irrigated areas of Njukini is difficult and the plot sizes are relatively smaller compared to 
other lowland without access to irrigated water. Cases of soil nutrient depletion, run off, 
new crop diseases, among other challenges were reported in the irrigated areas which 
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leads to the question of whether the pressures facing highland livelihoods will be 
replicated in the irrigated areas in the near future. Currently, lowland irrigated areas and 
the highlands are able to provide cheap produce, diversification options such as casual 
labor, and opportunities for trade because the differences in commodities produced along 
the gradient.  
Although highland farmers continue to have relatively higher economic potential 
compared to others lower in the gradient, the lowlands have recently become more 
important. This may signal shifting power relations among the different livelihood groups 
within the Mt Kilimanjaro gradient. As highland farmers chock with high population 
density, shortage of faming land, new crop diseases and fluctuating coffee prices, the 
lowlands provide alternatives for diversification, which intensifies social and economic 
relations among the different livelihood groups living in different ecological zones. The 
economic advantage conferred by the access to a good climate in the higher gradients is 
under threat from political economy factors such as access to land, labor, water, and 
markets for crops which in turn is causing a reorganization of social and economic 
relations along the Kilimanjaro gradient. The intensification of social and economic 
relations can be viewed as a positive step towards climate adaptation and especially for 
those living in the lowlands. In comparison to other livelihood systems along the 
gradient, farmers in the lowlands without access to irrigation water were more vulnerable 
to climate variability although they tended to have access to more land. This access to 
more land allowed them to lease their land to herders and mixed farmers for pasture 
during dry seasons. 
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Cross-border social networks and institutions 	  
 The intensification of social and economic relations among the different 
livelihood groups living along the Mt Kilimanjaro gradient comes with a heightened risk 
for conflict and the need to build institutions that promote social cohesion. The social 
networks among different groups along the gradient are rooted in histories of migration 
and settlement, ethnicity, kinship, and different types of material relations among other 
factors. These relations can be a source of unity and cooperation and thus serve to 
strengthen local cross-border livelihoods. However, these differing relations may also be 
a source of opposing identities and divisions and conflict. This is further complicated by 
the existence of a national political boundary, which brings into play jurisdictional issues 
that may make it more difficult to resolve issues using traditional inter-state mechanisms. 
Key informant interviews suggested that the national border is an important asset 
in livelihood diversification for groups living on both sides of the border. For instance, 
there was thriving trade on commodities such as farm produce, wholesale industrial 
goods, livestock, transportation, and small-scale retail goods. This trade is facilitated by 
availability of uninterrupted motorcycle transport locally known as bodaboda across the 
border. The border does not have a customs office and therefore all kinds of goods can 
pass through it with minimal restriction. Many respondents suggested that cross-border 
trade is beneficial for livelihood diversification and drought coping because commodity 
prices in Tanzania are more favorable than on the Kenyan side. The lack of a customs 
office made cross-border trade much easier because movement across the border is 
almost unregulated and traders did not have to pay customs for their goods as one of the 
key informants in Njukini stated. 
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“The prices are very favorable in Mkuu (referring to one of the main towns across 
the border in Tanzania). The youth mostly conduct that trade by use of their 
motorcycle taxis. They use bodaboda to transport goods across the border to the 
business people in the market. Others use bicycles and they do not pay any 
custom duty.”  
 
There was also a gendered aspect in both the person involved in various trade 
practices and the types of commodities traded. Most women crossed the border to buy 
and sell retail items such as tomatoes, onions, sunflower oil, and fruits. On the other 
hand, a lot of men crossed the border to sell livestock, transport traders and their goods, 
and also to buy timber for building because higher in the gradients. One of the key 
informants, a local businessman in Njukini, said that they depended on their Tanzanian 
neighbors who crossed the border to purchase Kenyan manufactured products and 
livestock for sale in Tanzania since they were mainly Chaga crop farmers. Participant 
observations also indicated that many young men work on the border point as 
businessmen and are mainly engaged in currency exchange and transportation for goods 
across the border. There were also strong kinship and ethnic ties between groups across 
each side of the border. Survey responses and key informant interviews shoed that several 
families stretched across the border while other ties were through intermarriage. For 
instance, 8% of survey respondents in Njukini were Chagga women married to men from 
Kenyan tribes. Kenyan herders, mostly ethnic Maasai, were also able to appeal to ethnic 
and kinship ties on the Tanzanian border to move their cattle across the border into 
Tanzania during periods of drought. 
However, despite the many economic and social benefits of the intensification of 
cross-border interdependence and social relations, a history of conflict and illegal activity 
was reported. Illegal livelihood activities such as trade in illegal drugs, mostly marijuana, 
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trade payment disputes, and cross-border livestock thefts were not uncommon. Key 
informant interviews reported that illegal cross-border activities were prevalent and were 
mostly facilitated by the existence of the international boundary. This international 
boundary is largely controlled from the capitals of Nairobi Kenya and Dodoma Tanzania. 
However, local scale social and economic relations including illegal activities were left to 
local formal and informal institutions. Apart from the informal agreements and 
institutions that had been arranged between local communities to resolve conflicts and 
regulate cross-border relations, the formal structures that exist between the two countries 
remain different and operate only within the country in which they have jurisdiction. 
Informal institutions backed by the established government institutions on both sides of 
the border dealt with local scale cross border conflicts.  
Due to the shared historical roots of many communities living in this border 
region, social ties among them facilitated a general relationship of friendship and 
cooperation, which allowed for small disputes to be resolved amicably by informal 
institutions. For instance, local conflict resolution committees known locally as Kamati 
za ujirani mwema (Swahili for Committees of good neighborliness) that existed on both 
sides of the border worked together to resolve cross-border conflicts. These are pseudo-
informal institutions because some members of the local government such as chiefs were 
members. An interesting observation was that locals from both sides of the border knew 
the members of these committees and their authority was acknowledged across the 
border. There were also other local informal institutions called Nyumba Kumi (Swahili 
for ten households) in the Kenyan side of the border, which were headed by one of the 
members of the ten households. The head of Nyumba Kumi worked with the chief to 
	   96	  
resolve conflicts involving his/her members and were only found on the border areas. It 
should be noted that these institutions exist in many border regions in Kenya and are 
meant to help the government identify legitimate citizens. They are therefore different 
from the Nyumba Kumi envisioned by the taskforce that was established by the Kenyan 
president after the 2013 Westgate attack by Islamic militants associated to Somalia’s al 
Shabaab. 
 A substantial number of groups that would have otherwise been considered 
farmers or pastoralists in African drylands are reporting increased reliance on alternative 
income sources such as casual labor, remittances, and trade as part of or their primary 
sources of income. This is happening in the Kilimanjaro gradient within a context of 
changing levels of integration into the broader political economy and climate variation. 
Opportunities for livelihood diversification offered by the great variation in ecological 
conditions over a relatively small area within the Kilimanjaro gradient provide local 
livelihoods with diverse benefits and allow for the intensification of social and economic 
relations. Different ecological and socioeconomic pressures coupled with a rich history of 
interaction and cooperation for mutual benefit also serves to strengthen social networks 
and institutions that govern local patterns of resource access.   
Conclusion  	  
 This study shows that there is various land use types within the ecological zones 
along the Mt Kilimanjaro ecological gradient. These various land use types are change as 
you move up the gradient from the plains to the highlands. The various land use types 
within the ecological zones give rise to different livelihood systems, which are set up to 
exploit the resources that come with the ecological conditions of their location in the 
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gradient. This study also shows that there is increasing livelihood diversification within 
the different livelihood types found in the gradient in response to ecological and other 
changes associated with political economy. This livelihood diversification varies along 
the gradient and includes increased dependence on livelihood options such as casual 
labor, trade, remittances, and cultivation of alternative land in different parts of the 
gradient. The patterns of change in livelihood diversification vary across the gradient. For 
instance, the irrigated lowland areas intensifying horticultural production as cash crops 
while the highland dependence cash crops such as coffee production wanes. Population 
pressure, soil depletion, decreasing farm plots, and government policies against the 
mountain forest encroachment are driving highland communities down the gradient to the 
lowlands in search of casual labor and alternative land for farming. 
 This study also shows increased interdependence among various livelihood 
groups along the gradient. The intensification of interdependence can be seen as both a 
diversification option and a way to transform livelihoods in response to ecological and 
economic change. The intensification of interdependence not only comes with benefits to 
foster cooperation and strengthen livelihood but also with challenges as conflicts arise 
due to increased contact among individuals and groups. The open national boundary is an 
important part of this intensifying interdependence and diversification as it provides 
crucial livelihood options through cross-border trade and social networks. Due to the 
unique location of the study area, institutions exist that govern social relations across the 
inter-state boundary and are largely able to resolve conflicts despite the existence of 
complicated jurisdictional issues. Local arrangements between formal and informal 
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institutions worked better in resolving cross-border conflicts than purely formal 
institutions because of broader state politics and local perceptions of representation. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 	  
This dissertation was about using social relations to explain the complex 
relationships between climate impacts, livelihood vulnerability, conflict, and changes in 
resource access patterns. Livelihood systems in many rural developing countries 
comprise social relations of both competition and cooperation and these relations may 
sometimes strengthen livelihoods or even cause conflict. The social relations in these 
places are also rooted in particular historical and material contexts but change in response 
to changing ecological and politico-economic trends. Consequently, temporal and spatial 
dynamics may affect the nature of social relations among individuals and groups living in 
a particular area and affect the types of livelihood choices that they make. For example, 
although resource conflicts among different groups in Africa existed even in the pre-
colonial period, it is widely accepted in political economy studies that the transition to 
capitalism through enclosure of natural resources by colonial and post-colonial 
governments continues to provide avenues for grievance and conflicts. This is even more 
important because rapid economic transition in many African rural economies is 
occurring in the context of changing ecological factors and therefore livelihood groups in 
these areas find themselves adjusting to multiple stressors at any particular time. 
However, these changes produce both losers and winners, which in turn may change local 
and broader power relations that are important in influencing access and control over 
local resources. For instance, a growing middle class in many African cities and towns 
has increased the demand for food therefore greatly benefitting some rural farmers with 
access to these markets. However, this situation coupled with increased wastage by the 
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middle class drives up food prices and increases the vulnerability of those who cannot 
produce or consume at the price for which the middle class is willing to pay.  
This dissertation examined how changing social relations as a result of changes in 
both climate and the political economy may affect rural livelihood systems and conflict 
trends. Through three articles, I illustrate the complex web of social relations that 
underlie the interaction of individuals and groups, how these relations change in time and 
space, and how these changes may alter the power dynamics that affect access and 
control of resources at any given place. The social relations may involve competition, 
cooperation, and conflict and these relations may sometimes exist at the same period and 
in the same place. In addition, the intensification of relations between individuals and 
groups may serve to strengthen local livelihood systems by providing diversification 
options from traditional livelihood sources. However, relations of competition and 
conflict may sometimes turn into violent clashes or undermine the livelihoods and 
existence of certain groups or individuals especially in the absence of necessary 
institutions for conflict resolution. Institutions are therefore critical for regulating social 
relations and maintaining an environment in which different interests can thrive without 
conflict or violence. This is in recognition that during this time of rapid politico-
economic and climate change in rural Africa, social relations tend to oscillate between 
modern private property rights and customary tenure, which is considerably communal 
with a lot of gray area. Consequently, modern property relations are generally not how 
resource claims are made; rather, what exists is a series of access claims about who gains 
and maintains access to resources at different times and across multiple scales. 
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These changing power relations in turn lead to a reinvention or transformation of 
existing institutions or the creation of new ones to respond to the new power structures. 
As explained throughout the dissertation, institutions are critical in arbitrating conflicts 
between groups especially in cases where increased contact has become necessary for 
strengthening livelihoods. Cooperation and harmony between institutions that serve 
different groups is also important in building capacity and also for enhancing a positive 
perception across their areas of operation. This is because people’s grievances may be 
influenced by the way they perceive previous conflicts to have played and how different 
institutions may have handled them. Both local and broader formal and informal 
institutions must also reinvent themselves in order to be able to handle changes that arise 
as a result of changing social relations.   
Themes of this dissertation 	  
This dissertation was organized into three papers that answer a set of different but 
related questions about the way people respond to political economy and ecological 
changes. The three papers broadly dealt with the following issues: one, the climate 
conflict nexus and why social relations are important in influencing conflict trends, two, 
changing social relations around land allocation and tenure in Africa, and three, changing 
social relations among livelihood groups within the Mt Kilimanjaro ecological gradient. 
All these social relations were examined within the context of changing material and 
ecological factors. The general findings were: firstly, local livelihoods change in response 
to ecological and politico-economic changes. However, these changes are often 
asymmetrical and happen within a particular historical and material context. 
Consequently, individuals may respond differently to similar climate or economic 
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stresses at different times. For instance, conflict may arise as a result of either positive or 
negative changes in ecological and/or politico-economic factors. Chapter two illustrated 
that climatic or even economic variables may not be sufficient in explaining the causes of 
conflict because of the multiplicity of factors that may underlie any particular conflict 
and also because these same factors may have the opposite effect of creating peace and 
more cooperation at different times and in different places. In fact, the same variable may 
produce conflicting responses in the same place at different times. For instance, economic 
growth may be both a consequence and a cause for conflict since it may disenfranchise 
certain groups and fuel grievances for conflict.     
Secondly, ecological and politico-economic change is influencing and 
transforming the way individuals and groups relate to each other in Africa’s drylands 
altering power relations and creating new winners and losers. Chapter three examined 
changing social relations around land and how that has produced a third system of land 
deals outside of customary and formal tenure. These changes are largely a response to 
overly bureaucratic and expensive formal titling regimes and a customary system that is 
highly variable and unequal. Policies and laws enacted to empower certain groups of 
society to afford them access and control may therefore be eroded by the existence of this 
third superstructure that is produced by the lack of harmony between the two accepted 
systems of land tenure. In Chapter three, I illustrated how the traditional dominance of 
highland farmers since the mid twentieth century may be slowly eroded by changing 
ecological factors and changes in the broader political economy. I showed that although 
highland farmers may still be relatively advantaged over their lowland counterparts, the 
decline of highland production systems and the increasing exploitation of water sources 
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for irrigation in the lowlands where there is relatively more land may be changing power 
relations in favor of more cooperation for mutual benefit along the ecological gradient of 
Mt Kilimanjaro. 
Thirdly, livelihood groups are exploiting opportunities brought about by changing 
social relations to strengthen their livelihood systems and renegotiate access and control 
of available resources. In chapter four, I examined the changes made by different 
livelihood groups along the Mt Kilimanjaro gradient in response to changing ecological 
and politico-economic changes. I found evidence of increased diversification across the 
gradient in terms of farming systems, crops farmed, and access to alternative livelihood 
sources outside of the primary household farm or farming in general. I also found 
evidence of the intensification of interdependence and the existence of institutions that 
regulate these changing patterns of local interactions. In addition, I found that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to determine which livelihoods rely primarily on natural 
capital in rural African drylands because the impacts of increased climate variability and 
the increased integration into the global capitalist economy has resulted in increasingly 
diversified livelihoods in these areas over time. Many farmers and herders reported 
increased reliance on social networks, casual labor, non-farm labor and other sources, and 
alternative sources such as remittances as primary sources of income. Bellow, I 
summarize the key findings for each of the three areas investigated in this dissertation. 
Summary of the Key Findings of this Dissertation 	  
On Causality: The first paper (chapter 2) examines the relationship between 
climate and conflict and is guided by the following questions: one, why are simplistic, 
environmentally deterministic approaches to the climate-conflict nexus so pervasive in 
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press, policy, and academic circles even when critical and empirical research shows that 
the relationship is much more complex? Two, what are the potential pitfalls of some 
recent quantitative studies that have aided the recent policy push? For the first question, I 
find that this discourse is sustained by the national interest of the global north that 
prioritizes the governing of subjects in the global south so that their responses to climate 
change do not threaten the security of the citizens and the states in the global north. 
Consequently, the policies that this discourse produces do not address the root causes of 
poverty that make individuals and groups in the global south vulnerable to climate 
change, rather, they address the security concerns of the impacts of climate change for the 
global north. I therefore find the human security discourse not pro-poor. On the second 
question, I find the generalization of all types of conflict without the explanation of 
conflict typology, scale, grievances, and other key factors that influence conflict too 
convenient in advancing a discourse on the potential causal relationship between conflict 
and climate change. In addition, the conflation of violence and conflict leads to 
misleading conclusions about conflict distribution and ignores many subtle conflicts that 
are resolved peacefully or never turn violent. 
On informal land transfers: The second paper (chapter 3) examines changing 
land relations in Africa with a focus on how informal land transfers may help circumvent 
protections for disenfranchised groups in formal policy and law. This situation of 
rampant informal trade in land, I argue, is produced by the existence of a dual, often 
inconsistent, and sometimes opposing sets of law in many African countries. I ask 
whether the ambiguity of rights within customary tenure offers any advantage to 
disenfranchised groups such as women and the youth especially in places where land, 
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whether under customary or statutory law, is already held as private property and is in 
high market demand. I find that the failure of policy and law to recognize that there are 
many areas where land is held privately without title facilitates the thriving system of 
land exchanges that may not be governed by customary of statutory law and policy. Even 
in places where land is titled and is in high demand, informal transfers are prevalent but 
there exists not policy guidelines to track these exchanges and make sure they do not 
disempower certain groups. This means that privately held land could change hands 
many times before it is titled and the last person to acquire title cements all the previous 
processes as legitimate sales. Without the formal title that legally legitimizes ownership, 
these informal transfers may continue to cause conflicts over land although most of these 
conflicts may be of a smaller scale such as between households or individuals. 
 On livelihood diversification and interdependence: The third paper (chapter 4) 
investigates the benefits of social and material relations among individuals and groups 
living along the Mt Kilimanjaro altitudinal gradient. This was done through an 
examination of livelihood changes over time within the different ecological zones of the 
mountain and how these changes have affected relations among the livelihood groups 
living there. I found that highland livelihoods are increasingly exploiting the options 
provided by the neighboring lowland gradients to bolster their livelihood status while at 
the same time changing their livelihood systems to adjust to politico-economic and 
ecological changes. Lowland areas have also undergone major changes in their livelihood 
system and exploit their highland neighbors for livelihood diversification. In all, I found 
that contact has increased between different livelihood groups in the last fifteen years. As 
discussed earlier, this increased contact offers opportunities for livelihood diversification 
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and may also result in increased conflict. In addition, the international boundary offers 
important diversification options such as trade for both highland lowland livelihoods. 
Due to the difference in production systems in Kenya and Tanzania, many goods are 
traded across the unregulated border. 
Shortcomings of this research 	  
I have argued and explained my research methods, results, and findings in this 
dissertation but this was not achieved was not without challenges. The first major 
challenge was that I was unable to travel to the research site within the period of my 
dissertation writing due to funding and other personal issues. However, I had access to 
sufficient data from the Pare-Kilimanjaro Local Knowledge and Climate Change 
Adaptation project (LKCCAP) in which I participated in data collection in the summer of 
2010. LKCCAP was a National Science Foundation (NSF) funded international research 
project with researchers from the United States and Tanzania, which ran from 2009 to 
2015. The research examined human-environment dynamics and local climate adaptation 
patterns in the Kilimanjaro region. I participated in research workshops and data 
collection exercises in Tanzania and ran the entire data collection exercise in the Kenyan 
side of the Kilimanjaro gradient. 
 The other major challenge was my positionality during the data collection 
exercise in Kenya in 2010. This was mainly because as a Kamba man, I belong to one of 
the dominant groups in Njukini whose claim to the land they hold is highly contested by 
the Maasai and the Taveta community groups. This was complicated by the fact that even 
within the Akamba speakers in this region, I was still considered an outsider because I 
come from the larger Ukambani region of Kenya while most Kamba inhabitants of this 
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area had migrated from Tanzania in the 1960 and 1970s. The Akamba of Njukini thus 
consider themselves of a different identity from other Akamba people from the larger 
Ukambani region. I therefore had to explain myself to each community group because of 
the suspicion of bias towards the Akamba and also the perception by the Akamba of this 
region that I was different from them although we spoke the same ethnic language. I 
overcame this by first hiring two research assistants from the Taveta and the Taita ethnic 
groups, spent three weeks in the research site familiarizing myself with the people, the 
issues, and the place, and explained myself during every interview I went. 
 A third challenge was that as a scholar from Kenya studying in America about 
local issues that were of immediate concern to my research participants, I was perceived 
to have some level influence on future government policy. Many research participants 
therefore requested me to speak to government officials about their plight while others 
confronted me to explain why the government was not addressing their concerns 
especially about land allocation and titling. I responded to this challenge by explaining to 
my research participants and audiences that the research I was conducting was purely 
academic and although I could publish it to journals and the Internet where government 
and other officials could access it, I could not guarantee that they actually read or act on 
it. More importantly I empathized with their problems and sought to create friendships, 
which helped me build trust. This relationship of trust made the process of data collection 
much easier. These were just a few of many challenges during my research. Other 
challenges included my gender as a man seeking information from women about issues 
with their access to local resources and different research participants interpreted that 
differently. In all, this was a learning opportunity for me. 
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Recommendations for future research 	  
 Land conflicts have been a major focus for research on livelihoods and resource 
allocation in Africa and other parts of the developing world for many decades. However, 
little attention has been given to the process and outcome of conflict in shaping 
grievances and influencing whether conflicts recur or not. In my post-graduation career 
either as an assistant professor or researcher, I would like to conduct research that 
critically examines the role of local institutions in mediating land conflicts, the positive 
and negative outcomes of local land conflicts for conflict groups and mediating 
institutions, and how ecological and sociopolitical changes may affect future trends in 
land and natural resource conflicts in particular areas. My interest in studying land 
conflict is driven by my findings in this dissertation of the importance of institutions in 
mediating or even sanctioning conflict. I would like to understand why and how some 
groups are able to form functional institutions to prevent conflict while other groups 
don’t. I would also like to understand why conflicts occur or recur in some places with 
mediating institutions and not in others. Qualitative evidence such as data on social 
organization and resource governance, local perceptions of identity, local perceptions on 
the processes and outcomes of past and current conflicts, and anecdotes on sociopolitical 
and ecological changes will be utilized. More flexibility in terms of funding sources will 
allow me to travel more and spent more time in field in order to collect data and learn 
local practices that drive local social relations. My studies will document the process and 
outcomes of conflict and seek to identify any evidence as to: a) what locally specific 
conditions underlie conflict in the study area, b) what processes influence whether 
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conflicts escalate to broad violence and c) the positive and negative outcome of local 
institutional mediation of conflict. 
Conclusion 	  
 In conclusion, the process of research and writing this dissertation has helped me 
learn invaluable lessons about the relationships that exist between climate impacts, 
conflict, and local resource access dynamics. As stated elsewhere in this dissertation, 
these relationships are complex and sometimes contradictory and therefore the pursuit of 
narrow causations in order to prove a causal relationship among them may oversimplify 
and distort our understanding of the relationship. More importantly, I have a clearer 
understanding of how the complex web of interests and power dynamics that characterize 
social relations in different places at different times influence who gains benefits and who 
loses out from certain resources. In places where climate impacts will be felt the most and 
in which conflicts are common, it is important for researchers to investigate which types 
of conflict may be more related to changes in climate and which ones are more related to 
local historical and sociopolitical factors. 
 Recent research on the relationship between climate and conflict indicate that 
local resource conflicts are likely to be associated with variations in resource access due 
to both biophysical and economic changes (Scheffran et al. 2012a). In my study area, I 
found that local conflicts may be influenced by intensification of contact necessitated by 
the need for diversification in response to both climatic and socioeconomic change. As 
local communities diversify their livelihoods, new alliances are developed, and new 
groupings based on interests form.  However, these new relations reflect a historical 
pattern of relations among the groups that live here suggesting that the historical context 
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cannot be overlooked in investigating contemporary social relations. A challenge 
therefore for many quantitative studies is to make sure that they consider qualitative 
factors such as changing power dynamics among individuals and groups, and the 
historical context of any particular context. 
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